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GHSA-qj2w-mw2r-pv39 CVE-2018-1000074

RubyGems Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability

High MavenRubyGems
Severity
7.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
2.88%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 86.86% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

RubyGems version Ruby 2.2 series: 2.2.9 and earlier, Ruby 2.3 series: 2.3.6 and earlier, Ruby 2.4 series: 2.4.3 and earlier, Ruby 2.5 series: 2.5.0 and earlier, prior to trunk revision 62422 contains a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in owner command that can result in code execution. This attack requires the victim to run the gem owner command on a gem with a specially crafted YAML file. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.6.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.jruby:jruby-stdlib
< 9.1.16.0
9.1.16.0

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
rubygems-update
< 2.7.6
2.7.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.jruby:jruby-stdlib Maven → 9.1.16.0

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.jruby</groupId><artifactId>jruby-stdlib</artifactId><version>9.1.16.0</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.jruby:jruby-stdlib:9.1.16.0")

rubygems-update RubyGems → 2.7.6

bundler
bundle update rubygems-update # Gemfile: gem "rubygems-update", ">= 2.7.6"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 7.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-228f-g3h7-3fj3
RubyGems HTTPS to HTTP redirect
Medium Also affects rubygems-update
GHSA-5mgj-mvv8-46mw
RubyGems does not verify SSL certificate
Medium Also affects rubygems-update
GHSA-qv62-xfj6-32xm
RubyGems Improper Input Validation vulnerability
Medium Also affects rubygems-update
GHSA-9qvm-2vhf-q649
RubyGems Regular Expression Denial of Service
Medium Also affects rubygems-update
GHSA-8qxg-mff5-j3wc
RubyGems Path Traversal vulnerability
Medium Also affects org.jruby:jruby-stdlib
GHSA-wp3j-rvfp-624h
RubyGems vulnerable to DNS hijack attack
High Also affects rubygems-update
GHSA-9j7m-rjqx-48vh
RubyGems Regular Expression Denial of Service vulnerability
Medium Also affects rubygems-update
GHSA-p7f2-rr42-m9xm
RubyGems Improper Input Validation vulnerability
High Also affects rubygems-update
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