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GHSA-6hfq-h8hq-87mf CVE-2021-21299 RUSTSEC-2021-0020

HTTP Request Smuggling in hyper

Medium crates.io
Severity
4.8 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
4.73%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 91.85% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Fix
0.14.3
Upgrade hyper to this version or later

Description

Summary

hyper's HTTP server code had a flaw that incorrectly understands some requests with multiple transfer-encoding headers to have a chunked payload, when it should have been rejected as illegal. This combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that understands the request payload boundary differently can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks".

Vulnerability

The flaw was introduced in https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/commit/26417fc24a7d05df538e0f39239b373c5c3d61f6, released in v0.12.0.

Consider this example request:

POST /yolo HTTP/1.1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: cow

This request should be rejected, according to RFC 7230, since it has a Transfer-Encoding header, but after folding, it does not end in chunked. hyper would notice the chunked in the first line, and then check the second line, and thanks to a missing boolean assignment, not set the error condition. hyper would treat the payload as being chunked. By differing from the spec, it is possible to send requests like these to endpoints that have different HTTP implementations, with different interpretations of the payload semantics, and cause "desync attacks".

There are several parts of the spec that must also be checked, and hyper correctly handles all of those. Additionally, hyper's client does not allow sending requests with improper headers, so the misunderstanding cannot be propagated further.

Read more about desync attacks: https://portswigger.net/research/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn

Impact

To determine if vulnerable, all these things must be true:

  • Using hyper as an HTTP server. The client is not affected.
  • Using HTTP/1.1. HTTP/2 does not use transfer-encoding.
  • Using a vulnerable HTTP proxy upstream to hyper. If an upstream proxy correctly rejects the illegal transfer-encoding headers, the desync attack cannot succeed. If there is no proxy upstream of hyper, hyper cannot start the desync attack, as the client will repair the headers before forwarding.

Patches

We have released and backported the following patch versions:

  • v0.14.3
  • v0.13.10

Workarounds

Besides upgrading hyper, you can take the following options:

  • Reject requests that contain a transfer-encoding header.
  • Ensure any upstream proxy handles transfer-encoding correctly.

Credits

This issue was initially reported by ZeddYu Lu From Qi An Xin Technology Research Institute.

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
hyper
>= 0.14.0, < 0.14.3
0.14.3
hyper
>= 0.13.0, < 0.13.10
0.13.10
hyper
>= 0.12.0, < 0.12.36
0.12.36
hyper
>= 0.12.0, < 0.12.36
>= 0.13.0-0, < 0.13.10
>= 0.14.0-0, < 0.14.3
0.12.36
0.13.10
0.14.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

hyper crates.io → 0.14.3

cargo
cargo update -p hyper --precise 0.14.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
  • Implementation: Use only SSL communication.
  • Implementation: Terminate the client session after each request.
  • System Configuration: Turn all pages to non-cacheable.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-f67m-9j94-qv9j
Parser creates invalid uninitialized value
High Also affects hyper
GHSA-f3pg-qwvg-p99c
Lenient Parsing of Content-Length Header When Prefixed with Plus Sign
Low Also affects hyper
GHSA-5h46-h7hh-c6x9
Integer Overflow in Chunked Transfer-Encoding
Medium Also affects hyper
GHSA-h3qr-rq2j-74w4
HTTP Request Smuggling in hyper
Critical Also affects hyper
GHSA-q89x-f52w-6hj2
Headers containing newline characters can split messages in hyper
Medium Also affects hyper
GHSA-9xjr-m6f3-v5wm
HTTPS MitM vulnerability due to lack of hostname verification
Medium Also affects hyper
EEF-CVE-2026-114216
Chunk extensions accept bare LF and CR, enabling request smuggling in Bandit
Not rated yet Same weakness, CWE-444
RUSTSEC-2026-0388
Pingora HTTP/2 :authority and Host header mismatch enables cache poisoning and host-based access control bypass
Not rated yet Same weakness, CWE-444
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