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EEF-CVE-2026-114216 CVE-2026-114216 GHSA-w5wc-g2hc-g7m2

Chunk extensions accept bare LF and CR, enabling request smuggling in Bandit

Not rated yet Hex
Severity
0.0 / 10
Unknown · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.60%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 48.84% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Fix
1.14.0
Upgrade bandit to this version or later

Description

Summary

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in the HTTP/1.1 chunked body reader of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to smuggle a second request past a front-end proxy via a chunk extension that contains a bare LF.

The chunked reader in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex takes the chunk-size line to be everything up to the first CRLF and discards everything after ; without checking it against the RFC 9112 chunk-ext grammar, so bare LF, bare CR and other control bytes pass. A proxy that ends the size line at a bare LF reads 2;\nxx\r\n40\r\n... as one request whose second chunk holds a GET /admin, while Bandit ends the body early and dispatches GET /admin as a separate pipelined request. Deployments without such a proxy in front of Bandit are not affected.

This issue affects bandit: from 1.12.4 before 1.14.0.

Details

1. Unchecked extension. In lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex, the chunked body reader takes the chunk-size line to be everything up to the first CRLF. Anything after ; is thrown away without being checked against the RFC 9112 §7.1.1 chunk-ext grammar, so bare LF, bare CR and other control bytes are accepted. The 16-byte size-line cap does not help, because the payload needs only 5 bytes.

2. Bandit's reading. For the body 2;\nxx\r\n40\r\n0\r\n\r\nGET /admin ..., Bandit takes 2;\nxx as the size line and 40 as the 2-byte chunk, and the embedded 0\r\n\r\n ends the body. Bandit then runs GET /admin as a second pipelined request.

3. The proxy's reading. A proxy that ends the size line at the bare LF sees only one POST, with the chunk xx and a 0x40-byte chunk that holds the GET /admin bytes.

Proof of concept

  1. Run Bandit with a Plug that reads the body and records each request's method and path.
  2. On one connection, send POST /public with Transfer-Encoding: chunked and the body 2;\nxx\r\n40\r\n0\r\n\r\n, followed directly by GET /admin HTTP/1.1 with Content-Length: 7 and the body \r\n0\r\n\r\n.
  3. Bandit dispatches both POST /public with the body 40 and GET /admin. A proxy that ends lines at a bare LF would have forwarded the same bytes as the single POST /public.

Impact

Behind a front-end proxy that treats a bare LF as a line ending and forwards chunked bodies unchanged, an unauthenticated attacker can have Bandit run requests the proxy never saw, getting past the proxy's access controls.

Workarounds

Where the front-end proxy can reach Bandit over HTTP/2, disable HTTP/1 with http_1_options: [enabled: false], so that the chunked body reader never runs.

Affected versions

Hex

PackageVulnerableFixed in
bandit
>= 1.12.4, < 1.14.0
1.14.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

bandit Hex → 1.14.0

mix
{:bandit, "~> 1.14.0"} # then: mix deps.update bandit

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
Low
Integrity (subsequent systems)
Low
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
  • Implementation: Use only SSL communication.
  • Implementation: Terminate the client session after each request.
  • System Configuration: Turn all pages to non-cacheable.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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Credits: Jonatan Männchen / EEF, Mat Trudel, Peter Ullrich

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