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GHSA-xhcq-fv7x-grr2 CVE-2019-0192

Critical severity vulnerability that affects org.apache.solr:solr-core

Critical Maven
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
78.23%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 99.58% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
7.0.0
Upgrade org.apache.solr:solr-core to this version or later

Description

In Apache Solr versions 5.0.0 to 5.5.5 and 6.0.0 to 6.6.5, the Config API allows to configure the JMX server via an HTTP POST request. By pointing it to a malicious RMI server, an attacker could take advantage of Solr's unsafe deserialization to trigger remote code execution on the Solr side.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.apache.solr:solr-core
>= 5.0.0, < 7.0.0
7.0.0
org.apache.solr:solr-core
>= 6.0.0, < 7.0.0
7.0.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.apache.solr:solr-core Maven → 7.0.0

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.apache.solr</groupId><artifactId>solr-core</artifactId><version>7.0.0</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.apache.solr:solr-core:7.0.0")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 9.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
CVE-2019-17558
Improper Input Validation in Apache Solr
High Known exploited Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
CVE-2019-0193
XML External Entity (XXE) Injection in Apache Solr
High Known exploited Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-qhr7-h655-pw6r
Apache Solr has hardcoded credentials in the Basic Authentication setup tool
Critical Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-vc2w-4v3p-2mqw
Apache Solr: Insufficient file-access checking in standalone core-creation requests
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-qr3p-2xj2-q7hq
Apache Solr: Unauthorized bypass of certain "predefined permission" rules in the RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-68r2-fwcg-qpm8
Apache Solr vulnerable to Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
Medium Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-4p5m-gvpf-f3x5
Apache Solr Relative Path Traversal vulnerability
Medium Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-37vr-vmg4-jwpw
Apache Solr: Backup/Restore APIs allow for deployment of executables in malicious ConfigSets
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
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