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GHSA-qhr7-h655-pw6r BIT-solr-2026-44825 CVE-2026-44825

Apache Solr has hardcoded credentials in the Basic Authentication setup tool

Critical Maven
Severity
8.1 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
3.92%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 90.34% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Hardcoded credentials in the Basic Authentication setup tool (bin/solr auth enable) in Apache Solr versions 9.4.0 through 9.10.1 and 10.0.0 allows a remote attacker to gain full administrative access to the cluster via publicly known default credentials installed silently alongside the user-specified account.

As an immediate workaround without upgrading, delete the template users (superadmin, admin, search, index) from security.json or change their passwords. The future, not yet released, versions 9.11.0 and 10.1.0 will not be vulnerable, and it will be enough to upgrade to solve the issue.

Not affected:

  • Clusters where bin/solr auth enable was not used to bootstrap BasicAuth
  • Clusters where template users have been assigned strong passwords after bootstrap

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.apache.solr:solr-core
>= 9.4.0, <= 9.10.1
No fix yet
org.apache.solr:solr-core 1 listed versions No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
  • Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
  • Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
CVE-2019-17558
Improper Input Validation in Apache Solr
High Known exploited Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
CVE-2019-0193
XML External Entity (XXE) Injection in Apache Solr
High Known exploited Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-vc2w-4v3p-2mqw
Apache Solr: Insufficient file-access checking in standalone core-creation requests
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-qr3p-2xj2-q7hq
Apache Solr: Unauthorized bypass of certain "predefined permission" rules in the RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-68r2-fwcg-qpm8
Apache Solr vulnerable to Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
Medium Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-4p5m-gvpf-f3x5
Apache Solr Relative Path Traversal vulnerability
Medium Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-37vr-vmg4-jwpw
Apache Solr: Backup/Restore APIs allow for deployment of executables in malicious ConfigSets
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
GHSA-4wxw-42wx-2wfx
Apache Solr Schema Designer blindly "trusts" all configsets
High Also affects org.apache.solr:solr-core
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