GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7 CVE-2026-110856
GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.13% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
- Fix
3.2.0- Upgrade gitpython to this version or later
Description
Summary
This is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made Actor._from_string regex-free, but parse_actor_and_date still runs _re_actor_epoch on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62.
Details
git/objects/util.py:322:
_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
.+? and (.*) can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required (\d+) ([+-]\d+) tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.
It is called from parse_actor_and_date (git/objects/util.py:335), which runs on the author and committer lines in Commit._deserialize (git/objects/commit.py:917, :931) and on the tagger line in git/objects/tag.py:129.
The published payload (letters plus an unterminated <) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:
author line (after author ) |
2 KB | 8 KB | 32 KB |
|---|---|---|---|
'a'*n + ' <' (advisory payload) |
0.0 ms | 0.1 ms | 0.4 ms |
' '*n |
28 ms | 453 ms | 7,700 ms |
| valid line, long name (control) | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms |
Cost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.
PoC
import time
from git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date
line = "author " + " " * 32000
t = time.perf_counter()
parse_actor_and_date(line)
print(f"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s") # ~7 s on 3.1.62
End to end, reading Commit.author on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid 1191999972 -0700 tail takes 1.3 ms.
Note for reproducing: git hash-object -t commit -w refuses such an object (missingEmail), so the test object was written with --literally. A remote can still serve one, because fetch.fsckObjects and transfer.fsckObjects default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 ("craft a commit object with a malformed author field").
Impact
CPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to Commit.author, Commit.committer or TagObject.tagger on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects.
Suggested fix
Match the leading field name with .[^ ]* instead of .+?. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but .[^ ]* cannot overlap the following (.*), so the backtracking disappears:
_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")
Verification on current main (73a72c9):
- Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.
' '*nat 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).- The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change
- The new regression test,
test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).
The full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.
diff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py
index a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644
--- a/git/objects/util.py
+++ b/git/objects/util.py
@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -> Tuple[int, int]:
# Precompiled regexes
-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*)$")
+# The leading field name ("author", "committer", "tagger") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than
+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the
+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.
+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")
def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -> Tuple[Actor, int, int]:
diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py
index cf4299d5..e1631420 100644
--- a/test/test_util.py
+++ b/test/test_util.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify
from git.objects.util import (
altz_to_utctz_str,
from_timestamp,
+ parse_actor_and_date,
parse_date,
tzoffset,
utctz_to_altz,
@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):
Actor("name last another", "some-very-long-email@example.com"),
)
+ def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):
+ # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make
+ # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.
+ # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.
+ for tail in ("", " notanumber -0700", " 1191999972", " -0700", " 1191999972 xx"):
+ line = "author " + " " * 32000 + tail
+ start = time.perf_counter()
+ actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)
+ self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
+ self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)
+ self.assertEqual(offset, 0)
+
+ # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.
+ actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(
+ "author Tom Preston-Werner <tom@mojombo.com> 1191999972 -0700"
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(actor, Actor("Tom Preston-Werner", "tom@mojombo.com"))
+ self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)
+ self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)
+
+ actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date("author " + "a " * 16000 + "<a@b> 1 -0700")
+ self.assertEqual(actor.email, "a@b")
+ self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)
+
@ddt.data(
("name", ""),
("name", "prefix_"),
Found with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.
Brian Willows
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| gitpython | < 3.2.0 |
3.2.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
gitpython PyPI → 3.2.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "gitpython>=3.2.0"- poetry
poetry add "gitpython>=3.2.0"- uv
uv add "gitpython>=3.2.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
The product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use regular expressions that do not support backtracking, e.g. by removing nested quantifiers.
- System Configuration: Set backtracking limits in the configuration of the regular expression implementation, such as PHP's pcre.backtrack_limit. Also consider limits on execution time for the process.
- Implementation: Do not use regular expressions with untrusted input. If regular expressions must be used, avoid using backtracking in the expression.
- Implementation: Limit the length of the input that the regular expression will process.
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2253
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8290c98d35465a38090cdcc1b17be6…
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0
- vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-3.2.0-redos-via-re-actor-epoch-in-parse-…
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7 GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58 GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution | Critical | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94 GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing | High | Also affects gitpython |
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