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GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w CVE-2026-100689

GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository

Medium PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.40%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 34.41% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
Fix
3.1.62
Upgrade gitpython to this version or later

Description

Affected: GitPython 3.1.61 (latest release) and main — git/objects/submodule/base.py. git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty, so both are identical here.


The gap

The fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name() and wired it into update() and five siblings, closing the .gitmodules name → .git/modules/<name> traversal. The other attacker-controlled .gitmodules field, path, is read raw:

# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177
def _set_cache_(self, attr):
    if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
        reader = self.config_reader()
        self.path = reader.get("path")          # raw .gitmodules value

and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:

400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path)      # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)
542:     path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)        # add()   — guarded
1041:    module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)   # move() — guarded

update() validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:

788:  self._validated_name(self.name)                    # NAME only
801:  checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath             # derived from self.path — unguarded
821:  os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)

So path = ../../../tmp/escaped in an attacker-authored .gitmodules selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what force_remove hands to shutil.rmtree.

The asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept — the project wrote _to_relative_path() precisely for this, and add()/move() use it. update() does not.

Honest limits (please read before rating)

  • The most common flow is not affected. Repo.clone_from(...) → repo.submodules → sm.update(init=True) re-derives path from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a .. component, so an evil .gitmodules never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a non-HEAD commit (a historical-commit API such as submodule_update(previous_commit=...)).
  • The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger. The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard's two call sites, the name-only validation in update(), and the unguarded abspath → os.makedirs() flow at 3.1.61 == main.

Suggested fix

Apply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:

# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):
checkout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path)   # raises if it escapes the working tree

Better still, validate at the boundary: reject a .gitmodules entry whose path is absolute or contains a .. component when the section is first read in _set_cache_()/iter_items(), so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with path = ../escaped alongside the existing name test would pin both fields.

Prior art checked

GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository's 30 published advisories — none mentions the path field or _to_relative_path. Searched issues and PRs for _to_relative_path, gitmodules path and submodule traversal: no report of this.

Credit

kta1kri.


Appendix — EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

=== EVIDENCE: GitPython — the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===
Mon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026

--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---

--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---
33:    _to_relative_path,
400:    def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: "Repo", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:
407:            path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)
542:        path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)
1041:        module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)

--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---
309:    def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:
321:        name = cls._validated_name(name)
541:        cls._validated_name(name)
788:            self._validated_name(self.name)
1040:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1181:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1439:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1440:        self._validated_name(new_name)
1489:        self._validated_name(self.name)

--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---

        try:
            self._validated_name(self.name)

            # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE
                # END early abort if init is not allowed

                checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath
                module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)

                # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in
                # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained
                # repository instead of trying to clone over it.
                if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):
                    try:
                        git.Repo(module_abspath)
                    except InvalidGitRepositoryError:
                        pass
                    else:
                        if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (
                            osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                        ):
                            raise OSError(
                                "Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty" % checkout_module_abspath
                            )
                        os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
                        self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)
                        mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)

--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---
    def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:
        if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
            reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()
            # Default submodule values.
            try:
                self.path = reader.get("path")
            except cp.NoSectionError as e:

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
gitpython
< 3.1.62
3.1.62

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

gitpython PyPI → 3.1.62

pip
pip install --upgrade "gitpython>=3.1.62"
poetry
poetry add "gitpython>=3.1.62"
uv
uv add "gitpython>=3.1.62"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 5.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Implementation: Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
  • Installation, Operation: Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
  • Operation, Implementation: If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
  • Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7
GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58
GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree
Medium Also affects gitpython
GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2
GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679)
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239
GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution
Critical Also affects gitpython
GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw
GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7
GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94
GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx
GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing
High Also affects gitpython
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