GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7 CVE-2026-114145
GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.42%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 36.68% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order
- Fix
3.2.1- Upgrade gitpython to this version or later
Description
Summary
create_submodule(name, path, url) clones a submodule into the repo's own .git
directory before it rejects the path. A path of ".git/hooks" is accepted by the
pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory,
and a file named post-checkout in the submodule becomes an executable
.git/hooks/post-checkout. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise ValueError,
but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted
hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the
hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.
Details
The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk. This breaks the "validate before mutation" invariant that commit 43a43cd8 ("Validate submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation") set out to enforce.
Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check only reaches the ".git" alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:
git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add) 599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # accepts ".git/hooks" 673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into <worktree>/.git/hooks 714: index.add([sm], write=True) # strict check only triggers here
git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items) 732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path) # rejects ".git", too late
_to_relative_path only blocks ../absolute/out-of-tree paths; .git aliases are
rejected only by _validate_repo_path, which was added in 3.2.0 (commit a75aedf3) and
runs at the index boundary. The ValueError it raises at line 732 does not roll back
what _clone_repo already wrote.
Version-dependent behavior:
- 3.2.0 .. tip bda18e08: _validate_repo_path raises ValueError at index.add, but the hook is already on disk and is not removed (incorrect order of validation vs. clone).
- 3.1.x (e.g. 3.1.59): _validate_repo_path does not exist and _to_relative_path does
not reject
.git; create_submodule(path=".git/hooks", ...) returns with no error at all and the hook is planted silently.
Proof of concept
Setup:
evilsub/ : a git repo whose ROOT contains an executable file named post-checkout (the payload)
victim/ : a git repo with at least 1 commit and a second branch, whose .git/hooks has NO
sample hooks (the state of a minimal/CI checkout, or git init with an empty
template dir, or GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR/init.templateDir empty)
import git, os.path as osp try: git.Repo("victim").create_submodule(name="x", path=".git/hooks", url=osp.abspath("evilsub")) except ValueError: pass # 3.2.0+: ".git" is rejected, but only AFTER the clone, so the plant already happened. # 3.1.x: no exception is raised at all; the call succeeds and still plants the hook.
victim/.git/hooks/post-checkout now exists, mode 0755, attacker-controlled, on every
affected version. Any later checkout runs it:
git -C victim checkout <other-branch> -> the hook runs -> code execution
Verified live:
- tip bda18e08 (3.2.0 + 3 commits): create_submodule raised ValueError from
git/index/base.py:732, yet .git/hooks/post-checkout was present and executable, and
git checkoutexecuted it. - 3.1.59: create_submodule returned with no error; .git/hooks/post-checkout was planted
and executed by
git checkout.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution. A library/app that creates a submodule from an
attacker-influenced path ends up with an attacker-controlled executable in
.git/hooks, which git runs on ordinary later operations. This affects any service
that derives a submodule checkout path from untrusted data, e.g. one that ingests a
submodule spec (name/path/url) from a user-supplied manifest or API request and feeds
path into create_submodule. On 3.2.0+ the library's own validation is the thing that
fails: it correctly rejects the .git path, but only after the submodule has already
been cloned into place, so an app that traps the ValueError reasonably believes the
unsafe path was blocked.
Preconditions (hence AC:H): (1) the app passes an attacker-influenced submodule path;
(2) the target hook name is free in .git/hooks, true for minimal/CI/container
checkouts and whenever init.templateDir/GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR is empty. With the default
sample hooks present, git clone refuses the non-empty destination and no plant occurs.
Affected: all tested versions from 3.1.x (3.1.59) through the current tip bda18e08 (3.2.0 + 3 commits). 3.1.x plants silently; 3.2.0+ plants despite raising ValueError.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| gitpython | < 3.2.1 |
3.2.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
gitpython PyPI → 3.2.1
- pip
pip install --upgrade "gitpython>=3.2.1"- poetry
poetry add "gitpython>=3.2.1"- uv
uv add "gitpython>=3.2.1"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order
The product performs multiple related behaviors, but the behaviors are performed in the wrong order in ways that may produce resultant weaknesses.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58 GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution | Critical | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7 GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94 GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx GitPython: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in Actor.name_email_regex — commit author/committer field parsing | High | Also affects gitpython |
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