Skip to content

GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc CVE-2026-76217 PYSEC-2026-3841

GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()

High PyPI
Severity
7.1 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.41%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.46% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
Fix
3.1.58
Upgrade gitpython to this version or later

Description

Summary

IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward **kwargs into git rm and git checkout with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file=<file> together with --pathspec-file-nul makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through GitCommandError.stderr, so the entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.

This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f - TagReference.create() with -F, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and cleared.

Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting

GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment "--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found":

Call site git command that advisory's assessment
IndexFile.remove() rm --pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found
IndexFile.move() mv same
HEAD.reset() reset same
HEAD.checkout() checkout same

That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with --pathspec-from-file alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the first line, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding --pathspec-file-nul - a sibling flag of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the whole file one pathspec.

Root cause

git/index/base.py:991-1043:

def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
    ...
    removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043

git/refs/head.py:237-268:

def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
    ...
    self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs)                                 # line 268

Neither has an allow_unsafe_options parameter or a check_unsafe_options() call.

Proof of concept

from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError

repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)

try:
    repo.index.remove([], **kw)          # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
    print(e.stderr)                      # <- entire file contents

Observed on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:

[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
       stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
       LINE2-SECRET-7777
       LINE3-TAIL-9999
       ' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
       LINE2-SECRET-7777
       LINE3-TAIL-9999
       ' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3

The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the canary being visible everywhere.

Scope correction to the table above

Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, two disclose and two do not:

Call site disclosed?
IndexFile.remove() → git rm yes, full file
Head.checkout() → git checkout yes, full file
HEAD.reset() → git reset no - git reset does not error on unmatched pathspecs
IndexFile.move() → git mv no

The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
gitpython
< 3.1.58
3.1.58

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

gitpython PyPI → 3.1.58

pip
pip install --upgrade "gitpython>=3.1.58"
poetry
poetry add "gitpython>=3.1.58"
uv
uv add "gitpython>=3.1.58"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 7.1

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Implementation: Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
  • Installation, Operation: Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
  • Operation, Implementation: If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
  • Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7
GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58
GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree
Medium Also affects gitpython
GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2
GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679)
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239
GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution
Critical Also affects gitpython
GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw
GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7
GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94
GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name
High Also affects gitpython
GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w
GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository
Medium Also affects gitpython
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor