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GHSA-f866-m9mv-2xr3 CVE-2011-2894

Spring Framework and Spring Security vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Medium Maven
Severity
Medium
The publisher's own rating, not a CVSS score
Exploit chance (EPSS)
8.60%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 95.09% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Spring Framework 3.0.0 through 3.0.5, Spring Security 3.0.0 through 3.0.5 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.6, and possibly other versions deserialize objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended security restrictions and execute untrusted code by (1) serializing a java.lang.Proxy instance and using InvocationHandler, or (2) accessing internal AOP interfaces, as demonstrated using deserialization of a DefaultListableBeanFactory instance to execute arbitrary commands via the java.lang.Runtime class.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6
3.0.6
org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
>= 2.0.0, < 2.0.7
2.0.7
org.springframework:spring-core
>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6
3.0.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.springframework.security:spring-security-core Maven → 3.0.6

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId><artifactId>spring-security-core</artifactId><version>3.0.6</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.springframework.security:spring-security-core:3.0.6")

org.springframework:spring-core Maven → 3.0.6

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.springframework</groupId><artifactId>spring-core</artifactId><version>3.0.6</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.springframework:spring-core:3.0.6")

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-659m-px2c-25wj
Spring Framework Denial of Service via AntPathMatcher
High Also affects org.springframework:spring-core
GHSA-vxf7-qj7q-83fh
Spring Security Vulnerable to User Attribute Enumeration when Using DaoAuthenticationProvider
Low Also affects org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
GHSA-x2wq-9x2f-fhj7
Spring Security Core has a TOCTOU race condition when One-Time Token login with JdbcOneTimeTokenService is configured
Medium Also affects org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
GHSA-vqxh-445g-37fc
Spring Security has a broken timing attack mitigation implemented in DaoAuthenticationProvide
Medium Also affects org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
GHSA-jmp9-x22r-554x
Spring Framework annotation detection mechanism may result in improper authorization
High Also affects org.springframework:spring-core
GHSA-8v5q-rhf3-jphm
Spring Security annotation detection mechanism has authorization bypass
High Also affects org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
GHSA-9pp5-9c7g-4r83
Spring Security authorization bypass for method security annotations on private methods
Critical Also affects org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
GHSA-hh3m-g4qj-4835
Spring Security Vulnerable to Authorization Bypass via Security Annotations
Medium Also affects org.springframework.security:spring-security-core
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