CVE-2024-39891
In the Twilio Authy API, accessed by Authy Android before 25.1.0 and Authy iOS before 26.1.0, an unauthenticated endpoint provided access to certain…
- Severity
- 5.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.67%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 76.78% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- Yes
- In CISA's catalog since Jul 23, 2024
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
In the Twilio Authy API, accessed by Authy Android before 25.1.0 and Authy iOS before 26.1.0, an unauthenticated endpoint provided access to certain phone-number data, as exploited in the wild in June 2024. Specifically, the endpoint accepted a stream of requests containing phone numbers, and responded with information about whether each phone number was registered with Authy. (Authy accounts were not compromised, however.)
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy
The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy
The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
References
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| EEF-CVE-2026-65626 Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose | Not rated yet | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-vwp5-f99x-x3rq Backstage has improper input validation in scaffolder task list ordering | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-v6q3-xqxm-6f5v Ghost: Invite Token Disclosure in Ghost Admin API | High | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-53vv-xm9f-mm82 Ghost: Password Hash Ordering Disclosure in Ghost Admin API | Low | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-2p9g-x3cv-5hh4 Private Weblate projects vulnerable to observable object existence disclosure via globally scoped object lookups | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f Coder: Login endpoint user enumeration via timing-defense placeholder in password comparison | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-4pjg-x8qj-33j5 SiYuan: authFilePublishAccess distinguishes hidden and forbidden documents from public and nonexistent ones, and issues a publish-auth cookie for documents it reports as forbidden | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
| GHSA-ppr4-5f46-j9c6 Budibase: Server Filesystem Existence/Read Oracle via Builder-Controlled MongoDB tlsCertificateKeyFile | High | Same weakness, CWE-203 |
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