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GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f CVE-2026-111933 GO-2026-6265

Coder: Login endpoint user enumeration via timing-defense placeholder in password comparison

Medium Go
Severity
6.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.22%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 13.27% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy
CWE-204 Observable Response Discrepancy
Fix
2.34.2
Upgrade github.com/coder/coder/v2 to this version or later

Description

Summary

userpassword.Compare() substituted a placeholder hash derived from the well-known string "hunter2" when the stored hash was empty. Submitting "hunter2" therefore matched accounts with no password hash (nonexistent users and SSO-only users) and a subsequent login-type check returned an HTTP 403 that disclosed the account's login type, versus 401 for password users.

Note: Practical exploitation is limited because the timing side channel is noisy and only reveals whether an account exists.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts and their authentication provider by submitting logins with the password "hunter2", distinguishing nonexistent users, SSO users (provider revealed) and password users from the response. This aids credential-stuffing and targeted phishing. No authentication bypass or data access resulted.

Patches

The fix derives the timing-defense placeholder from a secure random value that no supplied password can match.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line Patched version
2.34 v2.34.2
2.33 v2.33.8
2.32 v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR) v2.29.17

Workarounds

None.

References

  • Fix: #26205

Credits

We'd like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22433) for independently disclosing this issue!

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/coder/coder
all versions
No fix yet
github.com/coder/coder/v2
>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2
2.34.2
github.com/coder/coder/v2
>= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8
2.33.8
github.com/coder/coder/v2
>= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7
2.32.7
github.com/coder/coder/v2
< 2.29.17
2.29.17
github.com/coder/coder/v2
< 2.29.17
>= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7
>= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8
>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2
2.29.17
2.32.7
2.33.8
2.34.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/coder/coder/v2 Go → 2.34.2

go
go get github.com/coder/coder/v2@v2.34.2 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 3.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy

The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy

The product provides different responses to incoming requests in a way that reveals internal state information to an unauthorized actor outside of the intended control sphere.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-h58c-xccx-75m3
Coder: Stored HTML injection via unescaped ApplicationName and LogoURL appearance settings
Medium Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-qrwj-vh9x-gw5v
Coder's workspace agent API insecure redirect handling allowed cross-agent file read and write
High Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw
Coder's workspace app CORS origin check can be bypassed via UUID-based subdomain spoofing
Medium Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-7qw2-f75v-62f7
Coder vulnerable to stored HTML injection via workspace agent logs in AgentLogLine component
Medium Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-84rm-42xw-mx52
Coder's AI Bridge Proxy skips TLS certificate verification in default configuration
High Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-wqxv-w64v-5wh6
Suspended Coder users retain access to AI Bridge LLM proxy endpoints
Medium Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-f5vp-w269-392g
Coder vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded request body in AI Bridge provider endpoints
Medium Also affects github.com/coder/coder
GHSA-jqj2-x4c5-jfxm
Coder: Devcontainer recreate endpoint missing write authorization allows read-only roles to destroy containers
Medium Also affects github.com/coder/coder
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