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PYSEC-2024-323 CVE-2024-5998 GHSA-f2jm-rw3h-6phg PYSEC-2026-1514

LangChain pickle deserialization of untrusted data

High PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.36%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 29.86% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

A vulnerability in the FAISS.deserialize_from_bytes function of langchain-ai/langchain allows for pickle deserialization of untrusted data. This can lead to the execution of arbitrary commands via the os.system function. The issue affects the latest version of the product.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
langchain
< 0.2.9
0.2.9
langchain-community
< 0.2.4
0.2.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

langchain PyPI → 0.2.9

pip
pip install --upgrade "langchain>=0.2.9"
poetry
poetry add "langchain>=0.2.9"
uv
uv add "langchain>=0.2.9"

langchain-community PyPI → 0.2.4

pip
pip install --upgrade "langchain-community>=0.2.4"
poetry
poetry add "langchain-community>=0.2.4"
uv
uv add "langchain-community>=0.2.4"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Active
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-gr75-jv2w-4656
LangChain: Path traversal and sandbox escape in LangChain file-search middleware and loaders
Medium Also affects langchain
GHSA-3644-q5cj-c5c7
LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning
High Also affects langchain
GHSA-45pg-36p6-83v9
Langchain SQL Injection vulnerability
Critical Also affects langchain
GHSA-3hjh-jh2h-vrg6
Denial of service in langchain-community
Medium Also affects langchain
GHSA-rgp8-pm28-3759
langchain vulnerable to path traversal
High Also affects langchain
GHSA-h59x-p739-982c
LangChain directory traversal vulnerability
High Also affects langchain
GHSA-h9j7-5xvc-qhg5
langchain Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability
High Also affects langchain
GHSA-6h8p-4hx9-w66c
Langchain Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability
High Also affects langchain
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