GO-2026-4403 BIT-golang-2025-22873 CVE-2025-22873
Improper access to parent directory of root in os
Low
Go
- Severity
- 3.8 / 10
- Low · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.23%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.23% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-23 Relative Path Traversal
- Fix
1.24.3- Upgrade stdlib to this version or later
Description
It was possible to improperly access the parent directory of an os.Root by opening a filename ending in "../". For example, Root.Open("../") would open the parent directory of the Root. This escape only permits opening the parent directory itself, not ancestors of the parent or files contained within the parent.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| stdlib | < 1.23.9>= 1.24.0-0, < 1.24.3 |
1.23.91.24.3 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
stdlib Go → 1.24.3
- go
go get stdlib@v1.24.3 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 3.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Issue reports
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-4374-p667-p6c8 HTTP/2 rapid reset can cause excessive work in net/http | High Known exploited | Also affects stdlib |
| CVE-2020-0601 Certificate validation bypass on Windows in crypto/x509 | High Known exploited | Also affects stdlib |
| RUSTSEC-2026-0382 Distrust compromised intermediate certificates in crypto/x509 | Medium | Also affects stdlib |
| GO-2026-6613 HTTP/1 server connection desynchronization after 2xx CONNECT response in net/http | High | Also affects stdlib |
| GO-2026-6609 Lack of limit on size of parsed Range headers in net/http | High | Also affects stdlib |
| GO-2026-6608 Memory limit bypass when parsing MIME headers in net/textproto, mime/multipart | High | Also affects stdlib |
| GO-2026-6607 Reject malformed ECH outer extension references in crypto/tls | High | Also affects stdlib |
| GO-2026-6604 Root.Mkdir(All) can follow junctions out of the root on Windows in os | Critical | Also affects stdlib |
Credits: Dan Sebastian Thrane of SDU eScience Center
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