GHSA-xp3q-r38w-vgqm
SiYuan: The publish filter for local storage returns the administrator's entire storage map with only three keys sanitized
- Severity
- 5.8 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
0.0.0-20260729005258-4daee87d4152- Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to this version or later
Description
Relationship to GHSA-hgfg-j9pg-43xw
That advisory concerned the administrator's live UI layout, and commit 63c7d5474 resolved it by removing FilterUILayoutByPublishIgnore and nulling Conf.UILayout for readers. That fix is correct and complete for the live layout.
This report concerns a different endpoint, a different filter function and a different storage backing. /api/storage/getLocalStorage reads data/storage/local.json rather than Conf.UILayout, and its filter FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess was not touched by that commit. The consequence is that the same serialized tab objects the earlier fix withheld continue to be served, from the closed-tab history rather than the live layout.
Summary
Three routes, /api/storage/getLocalStorage, getLocalStorageVal and getLocalStorageVals, are registered with CheckAuth only and are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and anonymously when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. All three call model.GetLocalStorage() and then, for read-only roles, FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess.
That filter begins by assigning the administrator's entire storage map to its return value and then removes three specific fields. Everything else in the map is returned unmodified. A single unauthenticated POST with an empty body returns the administrator's recently closed tabs with their document titles and identifiers, their current search keywords and the paths those searches cover, the expanded private paths in their file tree, and per-document identifiers from several other keys.
Details
Routes. kernel/api/router.go:87-89 on master, the same block on the development branch:
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/getLocalStorage", model.CheckAuth, getLocalStorage)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/getLocalStorageVal", model.CheckAuth, getLocalStorageVal)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/getLocalStorageVals", model.CheckAuth, getLocalStorageVals)
No CheckAdminRole, no CheckReadonly.
The filter is an allowlist inverted into a blocklist. kernel/model/publish_access.go:911 on master and :1481 on the development branch, byte-identical on both:
func FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess(publishAccess PublishAccess, localStorage map[string]any) (ret map[string]any) {
ret = localStorage // the entire administrator map
publishIgnore := GetInvisiblePublishAccess(publishAccess)
// clears local-searchkeys["keys"]
// clears local-searchasset["k"] and ["keys"]
// blanks local-docinfo["id"], only when bt != nil, visible tier only, no password check
return
}
local.json holds roughly thirty keys. Three are sanitized. The rest are returned as stored.
What survives. Taking the client's own list of keys it round-trips through this endpoint (app/src/protyle/util/compatibility.ts:563), the notable survivors are:
local-closed-tabs. Up toSIZE_UNDOentries, each produced bylayoutToJSON(item, tabJSON)atapp/src/layout/Wnd.ts:779. This is the same serializer that produced the data in the earlier advisory: tab title,docIcon,rootId,notebookId,blockId,mode,action, and for a Search tab the entire config object. Unfiltered.local-searchdata. The live document-search configuration, includingk(the search text),r(replace text),hPath,idPath(the paths the search was scoped to) andtypes. Note the filter clears the search history array and the asset-search keyword, but leaves the document-search keyword itself. The project's own standard is applied to two of the three related fields.local-filespaths.IFilesPath[]of{notebookId, openPaths[]}, the expanded private notebook and folder paths in the file-tree dock.local-fileposition,local-outline,local-zoom. Keyed by document or block identifier, so each discloses private document identifiers.local-move-path.{keys[], k}, the move-document dialog's path history and last keyword.local-recent-docs,local-history,local-flashcard,local-dailynoteid,local-layouts.
The asymmetry is visible in the function signature. In the same file, kernel/api/storage.go:
| Handler | Filter | Receives *gin.Context |
|---|---|---|
getCriteria |
FilterCriteriaByPublishAccess(c, ...) |
yes |
getRecentDocs |
FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess(c, ...) |
yes |
getLocalStorage / Val / Vals |
FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess(publishAccess, data) |
no |
The two sibling filters take the request context and can therefore call CheckPublishAuthCookie to evaluate the password tier. FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess does not receive the context, so it cannot perform that check at all. The visible-only limitation is fixed in the parameter list rather than in the body.
Separately, local-recent-docs passes through this endpoint unfiltered, which bypasses the dedicated FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess that guards the same data on getRecentDocs.
Note on a prior assessment. getLocalStorage appears on lists of endpoints considered correctly filtered, on the basis that it calls a Filter*ByPublishAccess function. That observation is accurate and this report does not contradict it. The filter is called. What it does is assign the whole map and remove three fields.
No persistence side effect. The in-place mutations the filter performs do not corrupt the administrator's stored state, because GetLocalStorage re-reads and unmarshals storage/local.json on each call (kernel/model/storage.go:82), so the map is per-request. This is noted to pre-empt the concern rather than as part of the finding.
Proof of Concept
Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. An administrator who has used the client normally, closing some document tabs and running a search.
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/storage/getLocalStorage
{}
→ 200. The returned map includes, among others:
local-closed-tabs entries carrying title, docIcon, rootId, notebookId,
blockId for recently closed documents, including
documents the reader has no publish access to
local-searchdata k, r, hPath, idPath for the administrator's current
document search
local-filespaths notebookId and openPaths for expanded private folders
local-fileposition keys are private document identifiers
getLocalStorageVal returns any single key by name, so a caller who only wants the closed-tab history can request it directly.
For contrast, requesting the same underlying data through the sibling endpoint shows the filtering that is applied elsewhere:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/storage/getRecentDocs
{}
→ 200, filtered by FilterRecentDocsByPublishAccess
while local-recent-docs inside the storage response is not.
Impact
An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, obtains the administrator's working context: the titles and identifiers of documents they recently had open, what they have been searching for and where, which private folders they have expanded, and per-document identifiers across several other keys. Titles and search keywords are author-written text and routinely describe the subject of the documents they refer to.
The document and notebook identifiers disclosed here are also the input required by identifier-to-path and path-to-content resolution, so the value is not limited to the metadata itself.
No document bodies are returned, and nothing is written. Confidentiality only.
Suggested fix
Invert the filter into an actual allowlist. Return only the keys a publish reader needs to render published content, which is a short list along the lines of local-images, local-emojis, local-pdftheme, local-fontstyles and the theme and zoom preferences, and drop everything else by default. New keys added in future then default to withheld rather than exposed.
Additionally, pass *gin.Context into FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess so that any retained per-document entry can be gated with the full CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess including the password tier, matching the sibling filters in the same file.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | < 0.0.0-20260729005258-4daee87d4152 |
0.0.0-20260729005258-4daee87d4152 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel Go → 0.0.0-20260729005258-4daee87d4152
- go
go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260729005258-4daee87d4152 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45 SiYuan: getAttributeViewSearchTarget returns database row content to anonymous readers with no publish-access check, reopening the class closed one day earlier at the adjacent route | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-57v5-wqx3-cgj4 SiYuan: Database view structure (all view names, layout types and per-field visibility) is returned to anonymous readers by /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-4wwp-f6gw-6qm5 SiYuan: TLS Private Keys Readable via getFile (Incomplete Blocklist) | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-3cm4-ccvw-6xr6 SiYuan: /history/*path and /repo/diff/*path potentially exposing historical snapshots of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/* | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF) | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-p23f-cm6q-2qp8 SiYuan MCP asset.upload Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass) | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
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