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GHSA-4wwp-f6gw-6qm5 CVE-2026-85175 GO-2026-6663

SiYuan: TLS Private Keys Readable via getFile (Incomplete Blocklist)

High Go
Severity
8.7 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.33%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.58% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-552 Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
Fix
0.0.0-20260819144130-256d73aa7f94
Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to this version or later

Description

Summary:

IsForbiddenAbsPath() only blocks conf/conf.json by exact match. The TLS private key (conf/key.pem) and CA private key (conf/ca.key) live in the same conf/ directory and are absent from the blocklist. Any authenticated user can retrieve them via POST /api/file/getFile.

Root cause

kernel/util/path_guard.go, IsForbiddenAbsPath() has no entry for TLS key material. The getFile handler at kernel/api/file.go:497 skips the blocklist for RoleAdministrator, and in v3.8.1 all authenticated users receive RoleAdministrator (no non-admin role is currently issued to direct API consumers). The files are generated on every boot regardless of whether TLS is active.

Steps to reproduce:

# No token required on a default no-auth-code instance
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:6806/api/file/getFile \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path": "/conf/key.pem"}'
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:6806/api/file/getFile \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path": "/conf/ca.key"}'

Response: Raw PEM private key bytes.

<img width="927" height="467" alt="2026-08-19_14-19" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/12e0787f-6bfc-416a-b5ad-a22954e45c48" />

Impact:

On deployments with TLS enabled (--ssl flag or NetworkServeTLS), possession of key.pem allows decryption of captured HTTPS traffic. Possession of ca.key allows signing certificates trusted by any client that imported SiYuan's locaprompts users to do). The files exist on every installation even whenTLS is currently inactive.

Prior art:

This is the same class of bug as GHSA-9jfx-rc58-h23j (conf.json readable via template render) and GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 (MCP file tool blocklist incomplete). The fix is to add conf/key.pem, conf/ca.key, conf/cert.pem, and conf/ca.crt to IsForbiddenAbsPath().

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
< 0.0.0-20260819144130-256d73aa7f94
0.0.0-20260819144130-256d73aa7f94

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel Go → 0.0.0-20260819144130-256d73aa7f94

go
go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260819144130-256d73aa7f94 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 8.7

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-552: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties

The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xp3q-r38w-vgqm
SiYuan: The publish filter for local storage returns the administrator's entire storage map with only three keys sanitized
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45
SiYuan: getAttributeViewSearchTarget returns database row content to anonymous readers with no publish-access check, reopening the class closed one day earlier at the adjacent route
High Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-57v5-wqx3-cgj4
SiYuan: Database view structure (all view names, layout types and per-field visibility) is returned to anonymous readers by /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-3cm4-ccvw-6xr6
SiYuan: /history/*path and /repo/diff/*path potentially exposing historical snapshots of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/*
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj
SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF)
High Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-p23f-cm6q-2qp8
SiYuan MCP asset.upload Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass)
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj
SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34
SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files
Medium Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
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