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GHSA-x2w5-5m2g-7h5m CVE-2018-14720

XML External Entity Reference (XXE) in jackson-databind

Critical Maven
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
7.52%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 94.50% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
CWE-611 Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
Fix
2.9.7
Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to this version or later

Description

FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.7 might allow attackers to conduct external XML entity (XXE) attacks by leveraging failure to block unspecified JDK classes from polymorphic deserialization.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
>= 2.9.0, < 2.9.7
2.9.7
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
>= 2.8.0, < 2.8.11.3
2.8.11.3
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
>= 2.7.0, < 2.7.9.5
2.7.9.5

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 2.9.7

maven
<dependency><groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>2.9.7</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.9.7")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 9.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference

The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation, System Configuration: Many XML parsers and validators can be configured to disable external entity expansion.

References

Advisories

Other links

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-cxp5-3px4-pw24
jackson-databind quadratic forward-reference completion
High Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-wv8q-qhhj-9h54
jackson-databind retains every unknown raw type ID
High Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-q4xh-88c3-wmh7
jackson-databind: Duration XMLGregorianCalendar Unbounded Number Parse DoS
High Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j
jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf
jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-vvgp-rfg2-7rr6
jackson-databind: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54514: eager DNS resolution (SSRF) still present in InetAddress deserialization
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w
jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)`
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh
jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization
Medium Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind
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