GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j CVE-2026-83557
jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)
- Severity
- 5.6 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.72%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 53.83% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to Serializable, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated Comparable-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable.
Details
Affected file: src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java
private final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {
private final Set<String> UNSAFE = new HashSet<>();
{
UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]
UNSAFE.add("java.util.logging.Handler");
UNSAFE.add("javax.naming.Referenceable");
UNSAFE.add("javax.sql.DataSource");
// java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here
}
}
protected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,
JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {
return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE
}
The class's own JavaDoc acknowledges the design ("Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like java.lang.Object a custom implementation... is needed"), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that Comparable has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class does restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice — consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (Runnable was added recently for issue #5014).
This is specific to the default, unconfigured validator reached via bare @JsonTypeInfo usage. Global "Default Typing" via activateDefaultTyping() is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument — a correctly-configured BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator rejects the same payload under activateDefaultTyping().
PoC
Built entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, javac, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):
1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):
static class SafeThing implements Comparable<SafeThing> {
public String name;
public SafeThing() {}
public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }
}
static class Holder {
@JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
public Comparable<?> value;
}
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV
String json = "{\"value\":{\"@class\":\"...SafeThing\",\"name\":\"hello\"}}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing
2. Real JDK class substitution:
String json = "{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
3. Negative control — Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:
PolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
.allowIfSubType("PtvGapTest4").build();
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
.activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();
// same java.io.File payload
// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: "...denied resolution"
Observed output:
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3 Trying: {"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]} ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4 Trying malicious substitution: ["PtvGapTest4$Holder",{"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]}] REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id 'java.io.File' as a subtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution
Impact
Any application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. Concrete impact is demonstrated via java.io.File: an attacker can cause construction of a File object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive.
Suggested remediation:
- Add
java.lang.ComparabletoUnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE. - Audit other broad JDK interfaces (
java.lang.Iterable,java.util.EventListener) for the same gap. - Consider a narrower default for
isSafeSubType()for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditionaltrue.
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.11.0, < 2.18.10 |
2.18.10 |
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.6 |
2.21.6 |
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.22.0, < 2.22.2 |
2.22.2 |
| tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.6 |
3.1.6 |
| tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.2 |
3.2.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 2.18.10
- maven
<dependency><groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>2.18.10</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.18.10")
tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 3.1.6
- maven
<dependency><groupId>tools.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>3.1.6</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind:3.1.6")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists. For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.
- Implementation, Architecture and Design: Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/6156
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6155
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/eb3b7fc0f9c0d27f471550ac3316b17d19…
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6
- github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-cxp5-3px4-pw24 jackson-databind quadratic forward-reference completion | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-wv8q-qhhj-9h54 jackson-databind retains every unknown raw type ID | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-q4xh-88c3-wmh7 jackson-databind: Duration XMLGregorianCalendar Unbounded Number Parse DoS | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-vvgp-rfg2-7rr6 jackson-databind: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54514: eager DNS resolution (SSRF) still present in InetAddress deserialization | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)` | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-3pjw-73gf-8qr5 jackson-databind: @JsonIgnore on a Record property is bypassed with a PropertyNamingStrategy | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor