GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh CVE-2026-59889
jackson-databind: @JsonView bypassed for @JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.35%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays the buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property by iterating its properties and calling prop.deserializeAndSet() with no prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard — the exact guard processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() received in the #5971 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962 fix, and the guard BeanDeserializer.deserializeWithUnwrapped applies to directly-matched properties. As a result, a property annotated with both @JsonView(PrivilegedView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is written from attacker JSON even when deserializing under a more-restrictive active view.
Correction to the original framing (runtime-verified): the gap is NOT a per-field inner @JsonView (the unwrapped sub-object's own BeanDeserializer gates inner fields correctly). The unchecked gate is the view of the unwrapped CONTAINER property.
Intent proof (runtime, 2.x HEAD 21dd70dd and 3.x HEAD 7a5939d6)
An @JsonView(AdminView) property that is NOT @JsonUnwrapped → null under PublicView (correctly gated). The identical property WITH @JsonUnwrapped → fully populated (bypass). The fix the creator path already received, not applied to the regular-property method.
Impact — write-side mass-assignment / privilege escalation
@JsonView is commonly used as a write-side authorization guard: a public endpoint binds the body under readerWithView(PublicView.class) and groups privileged state in a nested object whose container property is @JsonView(AdminView). When that property is @JsonUnwrapped, an untrusted caller mass-assigns it. PoC: a self-service registration where AccountFlags{role,approved,creditBalance} is @JsonView(AdminView) @JsonUnwrapped; attacker JSON {role:ADMIN,approved:true,creditBalance:1000000} under PublicView binds all three → approved admin with arbitrary balance. The failing gate is a WRITE gate, hence integrity-high (C:N/I:H/A:N); no worse than the C:L/I:L parent and arguably higher as @JsonView-as-write-guard is the exact use case #5971/#5969 defended.
Affected
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind2.x: confirmed bypass at 21dd70dd (== released 2.21.4 / 2.22.0 line; includes the #5973 backport).DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSIONdefault=true.tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind3.x: confirmed bypass at HEAD 7a5939d6 (latest 3.x).DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSIONdefault=false → the stock-config repro is the common shape where privileged inner fields are individually@JsonView(PublicView)and the developer relies on the container@JsonView(AdminView); the 3.x PoC mass-assigns role/approved/creditBalance under PublicView. (The other simultaneous report's PoC was reportedly fixed on 3.x; this distinct container-property path is not.)
Additive variants (runtime-confirmed both branches; all closed by the same one-line guard)
- nested
@JsonUnwrapped(unwrapped-in-unwrapped) — recursive bypass. - merge /
readerWithView(...).withValueToUpdate(...)(PATCH/partial-update) — bypass; non-unwrapped merge control gates correctly. - builder-based deserializer (
@JsonDeserialize(builder=...)) —BuilderBasedDeserializerroutes through the sameprocessUnwrapped. - Honest non-findings: read-side serialization correctly honors views (no leak);
@JsonAnySetter+view and@JsonTypeInfo+@JsonUnwrappedare separate/unsupported behaviors, not this bug.
Fix
Add prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) (when MapperFeature.DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION/active-view applies) to the processUnwrapped() property loop, mirroring processUnwrappedCreatorProperties(). One change closes the impact PoC + all three variants across BeanDeserializer and BuilderBasedDeserializer. Full runnable PoCs (2.x + 3.x) + variant harnesses available on request.
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.5 |
2.21.5 |
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.0.0-RC1, < 2.18.9 |
2.18.9 |
| com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 2.22.0, < 2.22.1 |
2.22.1 |
| tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.5 |
3.1.5 |
| tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind | >= 3.2.0, < 3.2.1 |
3.2.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 2.21.5
- maven
<dependency><groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>2.21.5</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.21.5")
tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind Maven → 3.1.5
- maven
<dependency><groupId>tools.jackson.core</groupId><artifactId>jackson-databind</artifactId><version>3.1.5</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind:3.1.5")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-cxp5-3px4-pw24 jackson-databind quadratic forward-reference completion | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-wv8q-qhhj-9h54 jackson-databind retains every unknown raw type ID | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-q4xh-88c3-wmh7 jackson-databind: Duration XMLGregorianCalendar Unbounded Number Parse DoS | High | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist) | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-vvgp-rfg2-7rr6 jackson-databind: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54514: eager DNS resolution (SSRF) still present in InetAddress deserialization | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-mhm7-754m-9p8w jackson-databind: `@JsonView` bypass for creator properties with `@JsonTypeInfo(include=As.EXTERNAL_PROPERTY)` | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
| GHSA-3pjw-73gf-8qr5 jackson-databind: @JsonIgnore on a Record property is bypassed with a PropertyNamingStrategy | Medium | Also affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind |
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