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GHSA-vjcv-9j33-wj62

Duplicate Advisory: vm2: timeout Option Bypass via FinalizationRegistry Cleanup Callback (Unbounded Host Event-Loop Block)

High Withdrawn Oct 5, 2026 npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-r4fx-v8hh-22mv. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

vm2 before 3.11.7 (affected versions <= 3.11.6) does not enforce the VM({ timeout }) option on code executed outside the synchronous VM#run() call. The timeout only wraps the single call to _runScript() via doWithTimeout() in lib/vm.js, and FinalizationRegistry and WeakRef are exposed to sandboxed code unmodified (they are not among the hardened globals in lib/setup-sandbox.js). Sandboxed code can register a FinalizationRegistry cleanup callback against an object and then drop the only strong reference to it; vm.run() returns within the configured timeout, but when the V8 garbage collector later reclaims the object it invokes the sandboxed cleanup callback outside any vm2 timeout accounting. A busy loop in that callback blocks the host event loop for an unbounded period, resulting in denial of service. The time of invocation depends on the garbage collector (e.g. under memory pressure or with --expose-gc).

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
vm2
<= 3.11.6
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Withdrawn
  3. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-489w-w794-jq94
vm2: NodeVM zlib Buffers expose pooled host memory across the VM boundary
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GHSA-2v2p-6j97-cjg9
vm2: Host Promise rejection from an exposed constructor can terminate the vm2 host process
Medium Also affects vm2
GHSA-5h3f-q97h-ccvc
vm2: NodeVM custom resolution bypasses external path boundaries
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-pq68-rvw4-xp4r
vm2 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-f8gf-w286-fmq2
vm2: `allowAsync: false` can be bypassed through Promise thenable assimilation in VM and NodeVM
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-6rh5-qq4q-97xh
vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via fs/promises despite -fs, allowing host filesystem writes
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-8686-vhfx-7r3j
vm2: NodeVM node:-prefixed negative builtin deny bypass exposes child_process
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4
vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass
Critical Also affects vm2
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