GHSA-vg99-7gj7-2fr5 CVE-2026-73606 GO-2026-6635
SiYuan: The reference filter for getRefIDs checks visibility but not the password tier, disclosing that password-protected documents reference a given block
- Severity
- 6.9 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.33%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.57% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2- Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to this version or later
Description
Summary
/api/block/getRefIDs filters its results for reader roles through a helper that checks only the visibility tiers. The password tier is not checked, because the helper does not receive the request context and therefore cannot evaluate the publish auth cookie. A reader who has not entered a document's publish password learns that the document references a given block.
A function ten lines away in the same file does perform the full check, on the same input type.
Details
Route, identical at eef105683 (kernel/api/router.go:235) and dev a7ae96ce (:245):
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/block/getRefIDs", model.CheckAuth, getRefIDs)
No CheckReadonly, no CheckAdminRole.
The filter chain. getRefIDs (kernel/api/block.go:631) checks isEncryptedNotebookDeniedForPublish, calls model.GetBlockRefsInBox, then for read-only roles:
publishIgnore := model.GetInvisiblePublishAccess(publishAccess)
refDefs, originalRefBlockIDs = model.FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore(publishIgnore, refDefs)
FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore (kernel/model/publish_access.go:1324) collects the reference and definition identifiers, resolves their block trees, and delegates the decision to FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore (:1314), whose entire body is:
for id, bt := range bts {
if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {
ret[id] = bt
}
}
Inside that helper, CheckPublishAuthCookie, GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess, checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess and password all appear zero times.
The complete check exists in the same file. kernel/model/publish_access.go:431:
func checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(c *gin.Context, publishAccess PublishAccess, bt *treenode.BlockTree) bool {
if bt == nil || IsEncryptedBoxDeniedByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID) {
return false
}
publishIgnore := filterDisablePublishAccess(publishAccess)
passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishAccess)
return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) &&
(password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password))
}
Same package, same file, same *treenode.BlockTree input. One takes the context and evaluates the password; the other does not receive it and structurally cannot.
Route-level contrast. The adjacent getChildBlocks and getTailChildBlocks both carry model.CheckAdminRole.
Note on a prior assessment. getRefIDs has been described as correctly filtered because it calls a publish-access filter. It does. The filter it calls covers the visibility tiers only.
Proof of Concept
Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, Publish.Auth.Enable false, anonymous client. A public document referenced from a second document whose publish tier was changed between runs. getRefIDs was called anonymously each time.
| Tier of the referring document | Anonymous result |
|---|---|
| Public | reference returned (baseline) |
| Password-protected | reference still returned |
| Hidden | [], filtered |
| Forbidden | [], filtered |
The hidden and forbidden rows confirm the filter runs and works. The password-protected row is the defect.
Impact
An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, learns that a password-protected document contains a reference to a given block, without entering that document's password, and receives the block identifiers involved.
Scoped precisely: the response carries identifiers only. type RefDefs { RefID string; DefIDs []string }, returned alongside originalRefBlockIDs, a map of identifier to identifier. There is no reference text, title or content. The disclosure is the existence of a relationship, plus identifiers usable as input to other endpoints.
Confidentiality only.
Suggested fix
Thread *gin.Context into FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore and FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore, and use checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess in place of the bare CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore call, so the password tier and the encrypted-box check are both applied.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | < 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 |
0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel Go → 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2
- go
go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 6.9
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- Low
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 5.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-xp3q-r38w-vgqm SiYuan: The publish filter for local storage returns the administrator's entire storage map with only three keys sanitized | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45 SiYuan: getAttributeViewSearchTarget returns database row content to anonymous readers with no publish-access check, reopening the class closed one day earlier at the adjacent route | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-57v5-wqx3-cgj4 SiYuan: Database view structure (all view names, layout types and per-field visibility) is returned to anonymous readers by /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-4wwp-f6gw-6qm5 SiYuan: TLS Private Keys Readable via getFile (Incomplete Blocklist) | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-3cm4-ccvw-6xr6 SiYuan: /history/*path and /repo/diff/*path potentially exposing historical snapshots of data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json and data/templates/* | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF) | High | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-p23f-cm6q-2qp8 SiYuan MCP asset.upload Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass) | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin | Medium | Also affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor