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GHSA-v6c7-8qx5-8gmp CVE-2013-2185

Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Apache Tomcat

High Maven
Severity
High
The publisher's own rating, not a CVSS score
Exploit chance (EPSS)
7.20%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 94.31% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
7.0.39
Upgrade org.apache.tomcat:tomcat to this version or later

Description

The readObject method in the DiskFileItem class in Apache Tomcat and JBoss Web, as used in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 6.1.0 and Red Hat JBoss Portal 6.0.0, allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a NULL byte in a file name in a serialized instance, a similar issue to CVE-2013-2186.

NOTE: this issue is reportedly disputed by the Apache Tomcat team, although Red Hat considers it a vulnerability. The dispute appears to regard whether it is the responsibility of applications to avoid providing untrusted data to be deserialized, or whether this class should inherently protect against this issue. Regardless the tomcat maintainers have altered the behavior of this method in version 7.0.39.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
< 7.0.39
7.0.39

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.apache.tomcat:tomcat Maven → 7.0.39

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.apache.tomcat</groupId><artifactId>tomcat</artifactId><version>7.0.39</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.apache.tomcat:tomcat:7.0.39")

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-69r9-qgr7-g2wj
Apache Tomcat Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data vulnerability
High Known exploited Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-h3x4-894j-xpx5
Apache Tomcat's FORM authentication process has an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability
Critical Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-9xv2-5v5q-p794
Apache Tomcat's DIGEST authenticator has an Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability
Critical Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-gcx9-497g-6cp6
Apache Tomcat has an Improper Access Control, Incorrect Authorization vulnerability
Critical Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-5m62-pw8w-7w9f
Apache Tomcat - Security constraints not correctly applied
Critical Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-9m89-8frq-c98c
Apache Tomcat - AJP secret compared in non-constant time
Low Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-5mp6-jrq3-r938
Apache Tomcat: LockOutRealm treats user names as case-sensitive
High Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
GHSA-h6fc-48rj-7qqh
Apache Tomcat - Digest authenticator will authenticate any unknown user
Critical Also affects org.apache.tomcat:tomcat
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