GHSA-rw46-qg69-vg6h CVE-2026-52828

Kimai: ExportTemplate CRUD Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized TEAMLEAD Access

Medium Packagist

Severity: 0.0 / 10; Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.46%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.28% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix: 2.58.0; Upgrade kimai/kimai to this version or later

Description

Summary

The ExportController web routes for creating and editing export templates are gated only by the class-level create_export permission, which is granted to ROLE_TEAMLEAD by default. The corresponding API routes and UI button visibility correctly require the stricter create_export_template permission, which is granted only to ROLE_ADMIN and ROLE_SUPER_ADMIN. A TEAMLEAD user can directly access the template create/edit routes to create or modify global export templates that are visible to all users including administrators.

Details

The ExportController applies the class-level annotation #[IsGranted('create_export')].

The createExportTemplate (line 210) and editExportTemplate (line 220) methods have no method-level #[IsGranted('create_export_template')] annotation. The permission hierarchy in config/packages/kimai.yaml:103,115,122-123 grants create_export to ROLE_TEAMLEAD via the EXPORT permission set, but create_export_template only to ROLE_ADMIN and ROLE_SUPER_ADMIN.

The API controller correctly requires create_export_template. The UI template (templates/export/index.html.twig:124) correctly hides the create button behind create_export_template. Only the web controller routes are missing the check.

ExportTemplate entities are global — they have no per-user or per-team scoping (src/Entity/ExportTemplate.php:19-56). Any template created or modified by a TEAMLEAD which is marked as "Available for all users" is visible to and usable by every user in the instance.

A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.

Impact

Any user with ROLE_TEAMLEAD can create and modify global export templates intended to be managed only by administrators. The templates control the structure and content of exported data (columns, renderer, format). While the impact is limited to data integrity manipulation of a non-security-critical resource (no RCE, no credential exposure), it violates the intended permission boundary and allows a lower-privileged user to influence the data output format used by all users including administrators.

Solution

The permission check #[IsGranted('create_export_template')] was added to the ExportController covering the methods createExportTemplate() and editExportTemplate.

See https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-rw46-qg69-vg6h for more details.

Affected versions

Packagist

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
kimai/kimai	`< 2.58.0`	`2.58.0`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

kimai/kimai Packagist → `2.58.0`

composer

composer require kimai/kimai:^2.58.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Attack requirements: None
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system): None
Integrity (vulnerable system): Low
Availability (vulnerable system): None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems): None
Integrity (subsequent systems): None
Availability (subsequent systems): None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Packages

github.com/kimai/kimai

Timeline

Jul 14, 2026 Published
Sep 23, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 Kimai: Pre-2FA KIMAI_SESSION cookie grants full authenticated REST API access, bypassing TOTP	High	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-2xgg-2x8h-8xw4 Kimai: Improper Authorization in Project, Customer, and Activity Rate Edit Endpoints Allows Cross-Scope Rate Manipulation	Medium	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-xv4r-4885-gwpg Kimai has Improper Authorization in Team Member and Team Activity Assignment APIs Which Allows Expansion of Team Scope Beyond Authorized Visibility	Medium	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-jr9p-4h4j-6c58 Kimai: Default APP_SECRET in Docker Image Enables Cookie Forgery and Account Takeover	Critical	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-r8vr-m544-qh4h Kimai: Login CSRF in the Timesheet Stop and Restart API Endpoints Allows Unauthorized State Changes	Medium	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-c6w6-57jj-62vh Improper Authorization in Kimai Timesheet Restart and Duplicate Allows New Timesheets After Project Access Revocation	Medium	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-3q6q-26vg-v97x Kimai: Improper Authorization Through Activity Creation with Preset Project Allows Creation Under Unauthorized Projects	Medium	Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc Kimai: Timesheet PATCH/POST allows assigning to project outside user's team via query_builder OR-bypass	Medium	Also affects kimai/kimai

Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor