GHSA-rp6x-ggw6-8g56 CVE-2023-43668
Authorization Bypass in Apache InLong
Critical
Maven
- Severity
- 9.8 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.43%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 73.02% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
- Fix
1.9.0- Upgrade org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo to this version or later
Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache InLong.This issue affects Apache InLong: from 1.4.0 through 1.8.0,
some sensitive params checks will be bypassed, like "autoDeserizalize","allowLoadLocalInfile"....
.
Users are advised to upgrade to Apache InLong's 1.9.0 or cherry-pick [1] to solve it.
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo | >= 1.4.0, < 1.9.0 |
1.9.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo Maven → 1.9.0
- maven
<dependency><groupId>org.apache.inlong</groupId><artifactId>manager-pojo</artifactId><version>1.9.0</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo:1.9.0")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
- Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-98v7-xxxv-hcrh Apache InLong: JDBC Vulnerability for Invisible Character Bypass Leading to Arbitrary File Read | Critical | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-532x-j9r7-8f73 Apache InLong: JDBC Vulnerability For URLEncode and backspace bypass | Medium | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-r324-vgr5-73c9 Apache InLong: JDBC Vulnerability during verification processing | Medium | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-fgh3-pwmp-3qw3 Apache Inlong Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability | Critical | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-crwj-2r3c-gx2g Apache InLong Manager Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability | High | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-9xg9-hh45-xcm6 Apache InLong Manager Remote Code Execution vulnerability | Critical | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-jj32-3pf5-5mv5 Apache InLong Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability | High | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
| GHSA-pq67-9jf9-hc3c JDBC URL bypassing by allowLoadLocalInfileInPath param | High | Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo |
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