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GHSA-pq67-9jf9-hc3c CVE-2023-34434

JDBC URL bypassing by allowLoadLocalInfileInPath param

High Maven
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.70%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 77.23% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
1.8.0
Upgrade org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo to this version or later

Description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability in Apache Software Foundation Apache InLong.This issue affects Apache InLong: from 1.4.0 through 1.7.0. 

The attacker could bypass the current logic and achieve arbitrary file reading. To solve it, users are advised to upgrade to Apache InLong's 1.8.0 or cherry-pick https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/8130 .

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
>= 1.4.0, < 1.8.0
1.8.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo Maven → 1.8.0

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.apache.inlong</groupId><artifactId>manager-pojo</artifactId><version>1.8.0</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo:1.8.0")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-98v7-xxxv-hcrh
Apache InLong: JDBC Vulnerability for Invisible Character Bypass Leading to Arbitrary File Read
Critical Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-532x-j9r7-8f73
Apache InLong: JDBC Vulnerability For URLEncode and backspace bypass
Medium Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-r324-vgr5-73c9
Apache InLong: JDBC Vulnerability during verification processing
Medium Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-fgh3-pwmp-3qw3
Apache Inlong Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability
Critical Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-crwj-2r3c-gx2g
Apache InLong Manager Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability
High Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-9xg9-hh45-xcm6
Apache InLong Manager Remote Code Execution vulnerability
Critical Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-jj32-3pf5-5mv5
Apache InLong Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability
High Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
GHSA-rp6x-ggw6-8g56
Authorization Bypass in Apache InLong
Critical Also affects org.apache.inlong:manager-pojo
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