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GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9 CVE-2026-41660

Admidio has Inverted 2FA Reset Authorization Check that Lets Group Leaders Strip Admin TOTP

High Packagist
Severity
7.1 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.30%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 22.40% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
5.0.9
Upgrade admidio/admidio to this version or later

Description

Summary

A logic error in Admidio's two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users' TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin's 2FA.

Details

In modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition:

// modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId))
{
    throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

By De Morgan's law, this condition evaluates as:

  • Blocks when: NOT isAdministrator() AND $gCurrentUserId === $userId
  • In practice: blocks non-admins from resetting their OWN 2FA
  • Passes: non-admins resetting OTHER users' 2FA (the opposite of the intended behavior)

The intended logic should block non-admins from resetting other users' 2FA. The !== operator on line 84 should be ===.

A group leader who holds hasRightEditProfile() permission on an admin user (checked earlier in the flow) can exploit this to strip 2FA from administrator accounts, reducing their security to password-only authentication.

Proof of Concept

  1. As testuser (a non-admin group leader with edit rights on admin profiles), send:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>

mode=reset&user_uuid=<admin_user_uuid>

Result: the server removes 2FA from the admin account.

  1. As testuser, attempt to reset their own 2FA:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>

mode=reset&user_uuid=<testuser_user_uuid>

Result: SYS_NO_RIGHTS error. The user cannot reset their own 2FA.

This confirms the authorization logic is inverted.

Impact

A group leader (or any user with profile edit rights on an admin) can disable two-factor authentication on administrator accounts. This degrades admin account security to password-only, opening the door to credential stuffing or brute force attacks without a 2FA barrier.

Recommended Fix

Change !== to === on line 84 of modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php:

// Fixed condition: block non-admins from resetting OTHER users' 2FA
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId === $userId))
{
    throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

Found by aisafe.io

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
admidio/admidio
< 5.0.9
5.0.9

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

admidio/admidio Packagist → 5.0.9

composer
composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.9

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-hm42-q32m-vj4f
Admidio: CSRF on Plugin Install, Uninstall, and Update via Unprotected GET Requests
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-xw54-c3mx-9pm3
Admidio: Any logged-in user can delete inventory fields via `mode=field_delete` — incomplete fix of #2024
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-mch8-wf3h-6x88
Admidio writes session IDs and auto-login cookie values to application logs
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg
Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-x628-457g-2pw9
Admidio has IDOR in `documents-files.php` `mode=move_save` that lets any folder-uploader exfiltrate files from private folders
High Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-q6w3-hpfv-rg36
Admidio: IDOR in documents-files.php allows cross-folder file rename and description changes by unauthorized uploaders
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-xg76-5qj2-2hhv
Admidio: CSRF in SSO client `enable` action toggles SAML/OIDC clients without token validation
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w
Admidio's CSRF in registration `send_login` mode resets arbitrary user passwords
Medium Also affects admidio/admidio
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