GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895 CVE-2026-69152
brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.65%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 51.01% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- Fix
1.1.18- Upgrade brace-expansion to this version or later
Description
Summary
The maxLength mitigation added in 5.0.8 for GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg / CVE-2026-14257 is incomplete. It bounds the accumulator where results are combined, but not the intermediate arrays that feed it. A ~25 KB input still crashes the Node process with an uncatchable out-of-memory error, so try/catch around expand() does not help.
A second, related path in the same function lets a ~400 KB input block the event loop for over two minutes without ever exceeding the memory bound.
Details
maxLength was enforced in combine(), the single place output grows. Two arrays are built before combine() runs, and neither was bounded.
1. Comma alternatives accumulate without a running total (memory exhaustion)
Each alternative in {a,b,c,...} is expanded by its own recursive expand_() call, so each receives a full, independent maxLength allowance. The results were then concatenated into a single values array with no cumulative limit:
values = []
for (let j = 0; j < n.length; j++) {
values.push.apply(values, expand_(n[j], max, maxLength, false))
}
acc = combine(acc, pre, values, max, maxLength, ...)
With A alternatives, values can reach A * maxLength characters before combine() gets a chance to truncate it. At the default maxLength of 4,000,000 and 400 alternatives, that is well past any default heap.
2. Padded sequences ignore maxLength while generating (CPU exhaustion)
expandSequence() was bounded by max (the result count) but never consulted maxLength. A padded sequence's element width follows the input, so {0...01..100000} with a wide pad generates max elements, each as wide as the input, only for combine() to discard all but a handful.
Memory stays flat here, because V8 represents the padded strings as cons-strings, which is likely why this path was not caught alongside the original issue. The cost is time: work proportional to max * width.
| pad width | input bytes | results kept | time (5.0.8) | time (patched) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20,000 | 20 KB | 199 | ~7.3 s | ~20 ms |
| 100,000 | 100 KB | 39 | ~32 s | ~20 ms |
| 400,000 | 400 KB | 9 | ~124 s | ~18 ms |
Output is byte-identical before and after the fix; only the wasted work is removed.
Proof of concept
Memory exhaustion, against 5.0.8:
import { expand } from 'brace-expansion'
const part = '{' + '0'.repeat(50) + '1..100000}'
const input = '{' + Array(400).fill(part).join(',') + '}' // ~25 KB
try {
expand(input)
} catch (e) {
// never reached - the process is already dead
}
FATAL ERROR: Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
Aborted
Event-loop stall, against 5.0.8:
import { expand } from 'brace-expansion'
// ~400 KB input, returns 9 results after roughly two minutes of blocking CPU
expand('{' + '0'.repeat(400_000) + '1..100000}')
Impact
Denial of service. Any application that passes attacker-controlled input to expand(), directly or transitively through a glob or pattern-matching library, can be remotely crashed or stalled. The out-of-memory variant terminates the process and cannot be handled with try/catch.
Applications already on 5.0.8 are affected: the 5.0.8 mitigation does not cover these paths.
Patches
Both intermediate arrays are now bounded as they are built, using the same max and maxLength limits already applied in combine():
valuestracks a running result count and character length while alternatives are appended, and stops once either bound is reached.expandSequence()acceptsmaxLengthand stops generating once the sequence's own characters reach it.
As with the existing limits, output is truncated rather than allowed to grow without bound, which matches how max already behaves. The defaults sit well above any realistic expansion, so legitimate input is unaffected.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() or to glob brace patterns, or pass an explicitly small max and maxLength.
Note that a small maxLength alone was not sufficient on affected versions: it was applied per alternative rather than cumulatively, which is the root of the first issue above.
Credits
The memory-exhaustion bypass was reported by Alessio Della Libera, CEO & Co-founder at Numyra.
The sequence-generation issue was found while verifying that report.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| brace-expansion | < 1.1.18 |
1.1.18 |
| brace-expansion | >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.4 |
2.1.4 |
| brace-expansion | >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6 |
3.0.6 |
| brace-expansion | >= 4.0.0, < 5.0.9 |
5.0.9 |
| brace-expansion | < 1.1.18 |
1.1.18 |
| brace-expansion | >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.4 |
2.1.4 |
| brace-expansion | >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6 |
3.0.6 |
| brace-expansion | >= 4.0.0, < 5.0.9 |
5.0.9 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
brace-expansion npm → 1.1.18
- npm
npm install brace-expansion@1.1.18- yarn
yarn add brace-expansion@1.1.18- pnpm
pnpm add brace-expansion@1.1.18
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
- github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/139d015104e71433ad52a41d19467c48…
- github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/1e30c930238d7162802d88a94189182d…
- github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/688a99eeaab02627c2b89ba8ba4821fe…
- github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/cb4b9e47cc2ec777c14b2b4492fb431a…
Packages
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-qhr7-859c-m2p7 brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion on nested brace groups causing stack exhaustion | High | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-q2hr-2g5m-vwhr brace-expansion: Quadratic-time expansion of the `{a},b}` rewrite causes CPU denial of service | Medium | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion in parseCommaParts causing stack exhaustion | High | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash | High | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups | High | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-jxxr-4gwj-5jf2 brace-expansion: Large numeric range defeats documented `max` DoS protection | High | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-f886-m6hf-6m8v brace-expansion: Zero-step sequence causes process hang and memory exhaustion | High | Also affects brace-expansion |
| GHSA-v6h2-p8h4-qcjw brace-expansion Regular Expression Denial of Service vulnerability | Low | Also affects brace-expansion |
Credits: G-Rath, dellalibera, katzj
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