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GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp CVE-2026-13149

brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups

High npm
Severity
7.7 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.36%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 30.25% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Fix
5.0.7
Upgrade brace-expansion to this version or later

Description

Summary

brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.

In expand_, post is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don't use it:

const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [''];   // always recurses
  ...
if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
  if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
    str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
    return expand_(str, max, true); // restart — `post` discarded
  }
  return [str];
}

For input like a{},{},…, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but expand_ has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away. Each level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: T(n) = 2·T(n−1) ⇒ O(2ⁿ).

The max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.

Measured on 5.0.6:

groups (n) input bytes time
20 60 130 ms
24 72 1.9 s
26 78 7.8 s
30 (PoC) 90 ~2 min

Proof of concept

const { expand } = require('brace-expansion');
// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes — blocks for minutes:
expand('a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}');

Impact

Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.

Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release. The fix:

  1. Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential.
  2. Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.

Verified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n²) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.

If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
brace-expansion
>= 3.0.0, < 5.0.7
5.0.7
brace-expansion
< 1.1.16
1.1.16
brace-expansion
>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.2
2.1.2
brace-expansion
>= 3.0.0, < 5.0.7
5.0.7
brace-expansion
< 1.1.16
1.1.16
brace-expansion
>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.2
2.1.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

brace-expansion npm → 5.0.7

npm
npm install brace-expansion@5.0.7
yarn
yarn add brace-expansion@5.0.7
pnpm
pnpm add brace-expansion@5.0.7

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 7.7

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Proof of concept
Scope
N

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-qhr7-859c-m2p7
brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion on nested brace groups causing stack exhaustion
High Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-q2hr-2g5m-vwhr
brace-expansion: Quadratic-time expansion of the `{a},b}` rewrite causes CPU denial of service
Medium Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p
brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion in parseCommaParts causing stack exhaustion
High Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895
brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation
High Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg
brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash
High Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-jxxr-4gwj-5jf2
brace-expansion: Large numeric range defeats documented `max` DoS protection
High Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-f886-m6hf-6m8v
brace-expansion: Zero-step sequence causes process hang and memory exhaustion
High Also affects brace-expansion
GHSA-v6h2-p8h4-qcjw
brace-expansion Regular Expression Denial of Service vulnerability
Low Also affects brace-expansion

Credits: bnbdr, juliangruber, ljharb

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