Gotenberg has an SSRF deny-list bypass in IsPublicIP via IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local prefixes

Summary

IsPublicIP in pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go incorrectly classifies IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / deprecated site-local addresses as public IPs, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to reach internal destinations (e.g., cloud metadata services at 169.254.169.254) via a single crafted DNS AAAA record. This is a variant of CVE-2026-44430 (modelcontextprotocol/registry).

Details

IsPublicIP uses Go stdlib helpers (IsLoopback, IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, etc.) to block internal IPs. However, these helpers do not recognize IPv6 prefixes that embed IPv4 addresses:

addr.Unmap() only handles ::ffff:0:0/96 (IPv4-mapped) and has no effect on these prefixes. On dual-stack or NAT64-enabled cloud hosts, the OS kernel transparently routes these addresses to their embedded internal IPv4 destinations.

Vulnerable code (pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go L53-69, commit 93d0103):

func IsPublicIP(addr netip.Addr) bool {
    addr = addr.Unmap() // only handles ::ffff:x.x.x.x
    switch {
    case addr.IsLoopback(), addr.IsPrivate(),
         addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast(), ...:
        return false
    }
    return true // 6to4/NAT64/site-local incorrectly reaches here
}

PoC

cd poc/
./build.sh   # docker build (~30s)
./run.sh     # docker run — exits with code 1 (bug detected)

Expected output: IsPublicIP(2002:a9fe:a9fe::) = true — the function returns true for 3 addresses that wrap 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDS). Full test file available via GHSA private comment on request.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker controlling a DNS AAAA record can tunnel gotenberg's outbound HTTP client to AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS (169.254.169.254), leaking IAM credentials. The Chromium URL convert route returns the full response as a PDF (full-read SSRF). Affects all deployments with WithDenyPrivateIPs(true) on dual-stack or NAT64-enabled hosts.

Suggested Fix

Add explicit prefix checks after addr.Unmap():

var blockedIPv6Prefixes = []netip.Prefix{
    netip.MustParsePrefix("2002::/16"),
    netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"),
    netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"),
    netip.MustParsePrefix("fec0::/10"),
}
for _, p := range blockedIPv6Prefixes {
    if p.Contains(addr) { return false }
}