GO-2026-6773 CVE-2026-84312 GHSA-44xr-mrhh-qm78
Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant state parameter (login CSRF) in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
High
Go
- Severity
- 7.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.17%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 6.62% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0- Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to this version or later
Description
Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant state parameter (login CSRF) in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI | < 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 |
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 |
| github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI | < 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 |
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 |
| github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI | all versions |
No fix yet |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI Go → 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
- go
go get github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI@v1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-287: Improper Authentication
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use an authentication framework or library such as the OWASP ESAPI Authentication feature.
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
- Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
- Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
- Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
- Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
- Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xp Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools | High | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9 Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable | Medium | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-jrq7-xrjx-pcfw Nginx UI: Auto backup name allows path traversal outside validated storage path | Medium | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-5r62-gj48-897x Nginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to execute NJS in Nginx worker context | High | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-9jww-cxg5-rj9m Nginx UI: MCP `nginx_config_add` Bypasses Directive Validation — Authenticated RCE | High | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-76pm-mq2q-9gcr Nginx UI: MCP nginx_config_add skips config directive validation → authenticated nginx directive injection (RCE on the official image) | High | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-cf23-7qxj-xmhr Nginx UI: nginx config directive denylist (ValidateConfigFile) is bypassable via same-line ";" separation → authenticated directive injection (RCE on the official image) | High | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
| GHSA-5v7c-xpfp-p65m Nginx UI OTP secure-session step-up is missing on sensitive mutation routes | High | Also affects github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Credits: cyberxyz-security, nonkronk, therawdev
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