GHSA-ppwx-5jq7-px2w CVE-2026-23999 GO-2026-4564
Fleet: Device lock PIN can be predicted if lock time is known
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.14%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 3.40% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values
- Fix
4.80.1- Upgrade github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 to this version or later
Description
Summary
Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known.
Impact
Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp.
An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window.
However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors:
- Physical access to the device is required.
- The approximate lock time must be known.
- The operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts.
- Attempts would need to be spread over multiple days.
- Device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made.
As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls.
Workarounds
There are no known workarounds for this issue. Customers should upgrade to a patched version.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email Fleet at security@fleetdm.com Join #fleet in osquery Slack
Credits
Fleet thanks @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 | < 4.80.1 |
4.80.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 Go → 4.80.1
- go
go get github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4@v4.80.1 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Physical
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 5.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and select well-tested implementations with adequate length seeds. In general, if a pseudo-random number generator is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts. Pseudo-random number generators can produce predictable numbers if the generator is known and the seed can be guessed. A 256-bit seed is a good starting point for producing a "random enough" number.
- Implementation: Consider a PRNG that re-seeds itself as needed from high quality pseudo-random output sources, such as hardware devices.
- Architecture and Design, Requirements: Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators").
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw Fleet: ORDER BY column injection on activity list endpoints | Low | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g Fleet: Unauthenticated download of in-house iOS app binaries via predictable URLs | Medium | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GO-2026-6264 Fleet: SQL injection in Okta conditional access endpoint allows host-controlled compromise of the Fleet database | High | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GHSA-88p2-jj8w-j8qg Fleet: Observer-class users can view team enroll secrets and credential-bearing configuration via target search endpoint | Medium | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g Fleet DM Vulnerable to Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint | Medium | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GHSA-x4qr-qw6h-wvxq Fleet: Observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on Apple MDM commands endpoint | Medium | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GHSA-vxm7-9x8v-8gm4 Fleet has observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on labels host-listing endpoint | Medium | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
| GHSA-mxmp-wr3w-rvqx Fleet: IP spoofing allows bypassing API rate limiting | High | Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 |
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