Skip to content

GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g CVE-2026-101047 GO-2026-6268

Fleet: Unauthenticated download of in-house iOS app binaries via predictable URLs

Medium Go
Severity
6.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.24%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 15.65% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
4.87.0
Upgrade github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 to this version or later

Description

Summary

Two endpoints serving in-house iOS application packages and manifests in Fleet's enterprise tier are reachable without a hard-to-guess token in the URL, allowing an unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Fleet server to download an in-house IPA by guessing sequential title identifiers.

Impact

By design, Apple's InstallEnterpriseApplication MDM command requires that the manifest URL be reachable by the managed device without a Fleet session, so these endpoints cannot enforce session-based authentication. Fleet's legacy MDM installer path mitigates this by embedding a random, hard-to-guess token in the URL; the in-house iOS app endpoints (added later) were always intended to use the same time-limited-token pattern but the mitigation was not yet in place.

The result is read-only disclosure of in-house IPA binaries and their metadata (bundle identifier, version, name) that an operator has deployed through Fleet. This is enterprise-tier only — the free tier returns fleet.ErrMissingLicense. There is no privilege escalation, write access, or impact on hosts not managed by Fleet.

Workarounds

If an immediate upgrade is not possible:

  • Restrict network access to the Fleet server to trusted networks, as is typical for MDM deployments.
  • Remove in-house iOS apps that contain sensitive material from Fleet; in-house app IPAs are intentionally reachable by managed devices and should not be relied on as a confidential distribution channel.
  • Where available, configure CloudFront URL signing for software installers to limit the validity window of issued binary URLs.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Email us at security@fleetdm.com Join #fleet in osquery Slack

Credits

We thank @offset for responsibly reporting this issue.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
< 4.87.0
4.87.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 Go → 4.87.0

go
go get github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4@v4.87.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.9

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw
Fleet: ORDER BY column injection on activity list endpoints
Low Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GO-2026-6264
Fleet: SQL injection in Okta conditional access endpoint allows host-controlled compromise of the Fleet database
High Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-88p2-jj8w-j8qg
Fleet: Observer-class users can view team enroll secrets and credential-bearing configuration via target search endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g
Fleet DM Vulnerable to Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-x4qr-qw6h-wvxq
Fleet: Observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on Apple MDM commands endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-vxm7-9x8v-8gm4
Fleet has observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on labels host-listing endpoint
Medium Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-mxmp-wr3w-rvqx
Fleet: IP spoofing allows bypassing API rate limiting
High Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
GHSA-9vcr-g537-3w5v
Fleet vulnerable to OS command injection in software packages
Critical Also affects github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor