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GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 CVE-2026-35219

Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist

High npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.46%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.28% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Fix
3.41.3
Upgrade @budibase/server to this version or later

Description

Summary

Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured.

Vulnerable Code

Automation Steps (No Blacklist)

All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:

packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69:

const response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53:

response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)

packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684:

if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
  throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")
}

But BLACKLIST_IPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:

packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines 39-45:

if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
  return false  // Always passes when no IPs configured
}

Impact

  • Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module
  • REST API: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.
  • Cloud metadata: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ accessible via any automation step
  • Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs

Remediation

  1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps
  2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
  3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct fetch() calls
  4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
@budibase/server
< 3.41.3
3.41.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

@budibase/server npm → 3.41.3

npm
npm install @budibase/server@3.41.3
yarn
yarn add @budibase/server@3.41.3
pnpm
pnpm add @budibase/server@3.41.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
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GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435
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GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2
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High Also affects @budibase/server
GHSA-qw6m-8fw2-2v64
Budibase: NoSQL Injection via JSON Parameter Interpolation in MongoDB Query Execution
High Also affects @budibase/server
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