GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 CVE-2026-35219
Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.46%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.28% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Fix
3.41.3- Upgrade @budibase/server to this version or later
Description
Summary
Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured.
Vulnerable Code
Automation Steps (No Blacklist)
All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:
packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69:
const response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34:
response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53:
response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20:
response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29:
response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check
REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)
packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684:
if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")
}
But BLACKLIST_IPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:
packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines 39-45:
if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
return false // Always passes when no IPs configured
}
Impact
- Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module
- REST API: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.
- Cloud metadata:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/accessible via any automation step - Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs
Remediation
- Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps
- Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
- Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct
fetch()calls - SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @budibase/server | < 3.41.3 |
3.41.3 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
@budibase/server npm → 3.41.3
- npm
npm install @budibase/server@3.41.3- yarn
yarn add @budibase/server@3.41.3- pnpm
pnpm add @budibase/server@3.41.3
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-6x9p-4r67-5gjx Budibase authenticated arbitrary S3 signed upload URL issuance via `/api/attachments/:datasourceId/url` | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-hfhx-w8p8-4hc7 Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation | Medium | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435 Budibase: SSRF via DNS rebinding in the REST datasource integration | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-pmpg-2mxq-6xwr Budibase: NoSQL injection in MongoDB integration: collection dump, $where JS exec, cross-collection pivot, arbitrary update/delete | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-cr7p-cr3q-h5cm Budibase: Account Enumeration via Login Lockout Response Differential | Medium | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-pvcr-8mvp-w8qr Budibase: Chat-Link Handoff Identity Confusion (Same-Tenant Account-Link CSRF) | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 Budibase: MySQL DESCRIBE Backtick Injection via multipleStatements in Database Connector | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
| GHSA-qw6m-8fw2-2v64 Budibase: NoSQL Injection via JSON Parameter Interpolation in MongoDB Query Execution | High | Also affects @budibase/server |
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