GHSA-mrww-27vc-gghv CVE-2024-27304 GHSA-7jwh-3vrq-q3m8 GO-2024-2606
pgx SQL Injection via Protocol Message Size Overflow
High
Go
- Severity
- 8.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.11%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 65.91% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
- CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound
- Fix
- Available
- 5 packages have a fixed version
Description
Impact
SQL injection can occur if an attacker can cause a single query or bind message to exceed 4 GB in size. An integer overflow in the calculated message size can cause the one large message to be sent as multiple messages under the attacker's control.
Patches
The problem is resolved in v4.18.2 and v5.5.4.
Workarounds
Reject user input large enough to cause a single query or bind message to exceed 4 GB in size.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/jackc/pgproto3 | < 2.3.3 |
2.3.3 |
| github.com/jackc/pgproto3 | < 2.3.3 |
2.3.3 |
| github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 | < 2.3.3 |
2.3.3 |
| github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 | < 2.3.3 |
2.3.3 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx | < 4.18.2 |
4.18.2 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx | >= 5.0.0, < 5.5.4 |
5.5.4 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx | < 4.18.2 |
4.18.2 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx | >= 5.0.0, < 5.5.4 |
5.5.4 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/jackc/pgx/v4 | < 4.18.2 |
4.18.2 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx/v4 | < 4.18.2 |
4.18.2 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 | >= 5.0.0, < 5.5.4 |
5.5.4 |
| github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 | >= 5.0.0, < 5.5.4 |
5.5.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/jackc/pgproto3 Go → 2.3.3
- go
go get github.com/jackc/pgproto3@v2.3.3 && go mod tidy
github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2 Go → 2.3.3
- go
go get github.com/jackc/pgproto3/v2@v2.3.3 && go mod tidy
github.com/jackc/pgx Go → 4.18.2
- go
go get github.com/jackc/pgx@v4.18.2 && go mod tidy
github.com/jackc/pgx/v4 Go → 4.18.2
- go
go get github.com/jackc/pgx/v4@v4.18.2 && go mod tidy
github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 Go → 5.5.4
- go
go get github.com/jackc/pgx/v5@v5.5.4 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 8.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Unreported
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
- Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the data
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
- Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences. Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
- Implementation: Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range. Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
- Implementation: Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7] Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-j88v-2chj-qfwx pgx: SQL Injection via placeholder confusion with dollar quoted string literals | Low | Also affects github.com/jackc/pgx |
| GHSA-xgrm-4fwx-7qm8 pgx contains memory-safety vulnerability | Critical | Also affects github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 |
| GHSA-9jj7-4m8r-rfcm Memory-safety vulnerability in github.com/jackc/pgx/v5. | Critical | Also affects github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 |
| GHSA-fqpg-rq76-99pq Panic in Pipeline when PgConn is busy or closed in github.com/jackc/pgx | Medium | Also affects github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 |
| GHSA-v5fq-cf5m-vwv7 Dolibarr has SQL Injection in societe/class/societe.class.php via localtax1_value parameter | High | Same weakness, CWE-89 |
| CVE-2026-114625 VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact… | Critical Known exploited | Same weakness, CWE-89 |
| GHSA-v49j-62m6-pgrr Payload: SQL Injection in SQLite and Postgres | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-89 |
| GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion | High | Same weakness, CWE-89 |
Credits: paul-gerste-sonarsource
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